Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA by Bean, Kathleen S
Boston College Third World Law Journal
Volume 29 | Issue 2 Article 1
4-1-2009
Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and
ASFA
Kathleen S. Bean
Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville, kathybean@louisville.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juveniles Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Third World Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 B.C. Third World L.J.
223 (2009), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/twlj/vol29/iss2/1
AGGRAVATED CIRCUMSTANCES, 
REASONABLE EFFORTS, AND ASFA 
Kathleen S. Bean*
Abstract: This Article identifies circumstances that justify a state’s refusal 
to provide reasonable efforts to reunite parents with their abused or ne-
glected children. Since 1980, federal legislation has explicitly required 
states receiving federal foster care dollars to make reasonable efforts to 
reunite parents with children removed because of abuse or neglect. Con-
gress responded to widespread concerns that these efforts were responsi-
ble for children being returned to unsafe homes or being left in foster 
care limbo. Congress’s response, the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (ASFA), identifies three exceptions to the reasonable efforts re-
quirement. This Article uses the aggravated circumstances exception to 
identify situations where reunification efforts should be denied. ASFA’s 
exceptions, including aggravated circumstances, recognize the harm that 
results from making efforts to reunite in situations not appropriate for 
reunification. The reasonable efforts provision recognizes the harm that 
results from disrupting the parent-child relationship. To best protect a 
child against both of these harms, a court should first consider all rele-
vant circumstances, including the effects of the parental conduct, any de-
rivative harm to the child, and any remedial efforts by the parents. Before 
denying reasonable efforts to reunite, the court should also determine 
that the past or current harm or parental conduct is sufficient to trigger 
an ASFA exception; determine that reunification efforts are likely to in-
flict a very serious harm—either a return to a dangerous home or a stay 
in foster care that is too long; and identify a nexus between the triggering 
harm and the predicted harm. 
Introduction 
 In 1997, the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) was signed 
into law.1 With ASFA, Congress sought to achieve several objectives for 
children who are abused, neglected, or abandoned by their parents.2 
                                                                                                                      
 
* University Distinguished Teaching Professor, Middleton Reutlinger Faculty Fellow, 
and Professor of Law, Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville. 
1 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 629(b) (2006) (setting out the purposes of the Act); David J. Herring, 
The Adoption and Safe Families Act—Hope and Its Subversion, 34 Fam. L.Q. 329, 329–30 (2000) 
223 
224 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:223 
As its name suggests, one was to increase the number of adoptions for 
these children.3 Increasing adoptions, however, was primarily a means 
of serving and complementing the underlying objective of the Act re-
flected in the “safe families” part of the name.4 Foremost, Congress 
sought to shift the pendulum of the child protection system away from 
what many saw as an unreasonable emphasis on family preservation 
and towards permanency, and thus health and safety, for the children.5
 Congress was specifically concerned with a provision in the earlier 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) that re-
quired states receiving federal foster care funding to make “reasonable 
efforts” to reunite families with children removed from their homes.6 
ASFA’s legislative history reveals a widespread perception, by Congress 
and others, that reasonable efforts had become unreasonable, resulting 
in a system that was out of balance.7 States were too focused on efforts 
to return abused and neglected children to their homes, thus endan-
gering children in the name of family preservation.8
 Returning children to homes made safe, and doing so quickly, 
does protect the children; it minimizes the psychological damage that 
can come from disrupting the parent-child relationship.9 Returning 
children to homes that are not yet safe, however, does not.10 Nor does 
requiring children to wait in foster care for years, while efforts are ex-
pended to make their homes safe.11 For a child in one of these situa-
tions, health and safety often means adoption by a new family.12
                                                                                                                      
 
(offering a comprehensive overview of ASFA); see also Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, 
Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 95, 110–11 (1999); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Is There Justice in Children’s Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 112, 113–14 (1999). 
3 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 113 n.5. 
4 See id. 
5 See generally id. (discussing the shift towards protecting children’s health and safety 
and away from protecting family integrity). 
6 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 
§ 471(a)(15), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); 
H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 7–11 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2742–43; see also 
Herring, supra note 2, at 330, 336–38. 
7 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 7–11. 
8 See id. at 8. 
9 See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adop-
tion and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 637, 653–54 (1999) (noting that studies 
show disrupting the parent-child relationship can harm children by “causing psychological 
difficulties, antisocial behavior, and low achievement”). 
10 See id. at 646–48. 
11 Id. at 655–56. 
12 See id. at 656; 143 Cong. Rec. H2013 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Pryce). Representative Pryce argued that: 
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 To better protect these children, Congress attempted to clarify 
AACWA’s reasonable efforts requirement.13 A key part of this clarifica-
tion was to single out a handful of circumstances where efforts to re-
unite were not required.14 States were granted discretion to bypass rea-
sonable efforts when a parent had committed murder or voluntary 
manslaughter of another child of the parent; when a parent had been 
complicit in such a murder or manslaughter, or an attempted murder 
or manslaughter; when a parent had committed a felony assault result-
ing in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent; 
and when the parent’s rights to a sibling of the child had been termi-
nated involuntarily.15 One additional circumstance was more ambigu-
ous, however.16 Under ASFA, “reasonable efforts to reunite children 
with their parents” are not required if “the parent has subjected the 
child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which defini-
tion may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, 
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse).”17
 Providing states with the explicit discretion to deny reasonable ef-
forts when circumstances indicate that children and parents cannot 
safely be reunited within a reasonable time should protect children.18 
ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception, however, by itself, fails to 
provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing cases where reasonable 
efforts should be bypassed.19 Director of the Children’s Defense Fund 
MaryLee Allen, warned of this danger in an early hearing on the provi-
                                                                                                                      
This bill addresses the frustrating problem of how to promote adoption of 
foster children who through no fault of their own are unable to return to 
their natural parents and who have languished for far too long in the foster 
care system. It is time to stop the revolving door of foster care that sends chil-
dren from home to home to home with little or no hope that they will live 
with the same families from one month to another. . . . H.R. 867 places the 
safety and well-being of children above efforts by the State to reunite them 
with biological parents who have abused or neglected them. 
Id.; see also Susan Vivian Mangold, Transgressing the Border Between Protection and Empowerment 
for Domestic Violence Victims and Older Children: Empowerment as Protection in the Foster Care 
System, 36 New Eng. L. Rev. 69, 93–95 (2001) (discussing ASFA’s “shift away from reunifi-
cation and toward adoption”). 
13 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 7–11. 
14 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D) (2006)). 
15 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
16 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
17 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (emphasis added). 
18 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
19 See id. 
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sions of ASFA.20 When addressing legislative efforts to clarify the rea-
sonable efforts provision, Allen advised that: “Congress must proceed 
cautiously so as to not create new problems by using terms that are sub-
ject to numerous interpretations (such as ‘aggravated circumstances’) 
or widening the arc of pendulum swings in an area of policy that is al-
ready too volatile for children’s well-being.”21 Similarly, shortly after 
ASFA was enacted, Sheila Harrigan, Executive Director of the New York 
Public Welfare Association, warned that New York needed to statutorily 
define “aggravated circumstances,” to give courts some direction for 
when to bypass reunification efforts.22 “Otherwise,” she explained, 
“much time, [effort], and money will be wasted before case law [will] 
slowly begin to define the concept of aggravated circumstances.”23
 The impact on the health and safety of children when reunifica-
tion efforts are not required can be tremendous.24 It ends the state’s 
“responsibility to provide services,” it ends the “duty to facilitate and 
encourage visitation,” and it “almost inevitably places the parent just 
steps away from termination of parental rights.”25 Without reasonable 
efforts, the opportunity to address the problems that contributed to the 
child’s removal and to work towards reunification to avoid the damage 
from disrupting the parent-child relationship is remote.26 The vague-
                                                                                                                      
20 ASFA was originally introduced as the Adoption Promotion Act of 1997 (H.R. 867) 
in the House Ways and Means Committee by Representatives Dave Camp (Mich.), Barbara 
B. Kennelly (Conn.), and E. Clay Shaw (Fla.). Katherine A. Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months 
Beyond the Best Interest of the Child?: ASFA’s Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1879, 1893–94 (2001). 
21 The “Adoption Promotion Act of 1997”: Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the Subcomm. on Human 
Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 49 (1997) (statement of MaryLee 
Allen, Director, Child Welfare and Mental Health Division, Children’s Defense Fund) [here-
inafter Hearing on H.R. 867]. Allen noted that most of the cases to which child protection 
workers are assigned present health and safety concerns: “[T]he challenge for the worker in 
interpreting the reasonable efforts provision is to decide when services or other efforts can 
reasonably prevent these health and safety concerns from endangering the child.” Id. at 50. 
22 Margaret A. Burt, Public Interest Workshop Track, in Practising Law Institute, Chil-
dren’s Law Institute Course Handbook 314–15 (1998). 
23 Id. (“It is very likely that case law definition would also result in uneven definition 
across the state, which would be unfair to children and families. Everyone involved should 
be on fair notice of what egregious abusive actions may result in a court ruling that efforts 
will not be made to reunite the family.”) 
24 See In re Jaime S., 798 N.Y.S.2d 667, 672 (Fam. Ct. 2005). 
25 Id. (noting that without services and visitation provided for the parent, “there is lit-
tle, if any, hope for reunification”). 
26 See IV Christine P. Costantakos, Nebraska Juvenile Court Law and Practice 
§ 10.2(E)(1)(2008); see also In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 435 (Neb. 2003) (noting 
that “dispensing with reasonable efforts at reunification frequently amounts to a substan-
tial step toward termination of parental rights”). 
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ness of the aggravated circumstances exception contributes to the like-
lihood that life-altering decisions will be arbitrary, capricious, and dis-
criminatory.27 The phrase invites inconsistent, unpredictable decisions 
about when a state should expend efforts to reunite a child with his or 
her parents.28
 The aggravated circumstances exception was written in anticipa-
tion of decisions to forego reasonable efforts at the outset of depend-
ency cases.29 Decisions on whether a state should discontinue reason-
able efforts once begun, however, raise the same question: based on 
what we know about this child and these parents at this time, will reuni-
fication efforts so threaten the child’s health or safety that we should 
forego or discontinue those efforts? By examining the aggravated cir-
cumstance exception in detail, I hope to contribute to a more system-
atic approach that will help judges, lawyers, and social workers respon-
sible for answering this question.30
 My analysis of ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception first 
chronicles what seems fairly apparent—the purpose of Congress in 
passing ASFA. It includes a quick review of the 1980 AACWA and its 
reasonable efforts provision, along with a more detailed discussion of 
the related provisions of ASFA. I then look at the legislative history of 
ASFA, with a particular focus on reasonable efforts and the aggravated 
circumstances exception. At the same time I examine the case law, es-
pecially those cases that have made pointed efforts to define aggravated 
circumstances. 
 Ultimately, I conclude that decisions to deny reasonable efforts 
must be based on more than the existence of past or current “aggra-
vated circumstances.” A decision to deny reasonable efforts must articu-
late how the circumstances predict a sufficiently serious harm to the 
child should reunification efforts be attempted. While I offer an ana-
lytical approach for these cases, I have no neat and tidy solution for the 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 49–50; Burt, supra note 22, at 314–15. 
28 See Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 49–50. 
29 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
DeWine). 
30 According to a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, limited data 
suggest that some judges are reluctant to allow the state to bypass reunification efforts. See 
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Foster Care: Recent Legislation Helps States 
Focus on Finding Permanent Homes for Children, but Long-Standing Barriers 
Remain 24–25 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02585.pdf (reporting 
that “some judges believe that parents should always be given the opportunity to reunify 
with their children”). There should be reluctance. But with a better understanding of what 
should constitute aggravated circumstances, and why, judges may be more willing to deny 
reasonable efforts when necessary to protect the health and safety of the child. 
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individuals who must ultimately make these difficult decisions. I hope, 
however, that my discussion will contribute to the health and safety of 
the children in the dependency system. 
 I do make certain assumptions when writing in this area, all of 
which are consistent with ASFA: first, as specifically provided by ASFA, a 
child’s health and safety must be paramount;31 second, as is implicit in 
ASFA, preserving the parent-child relationship presumptively contrib-
utes to a child’s health and safety;32 third, some parents are so harmful 
to their children that “the harm outweighs the presumptive benefit of 
the parent-child relationship”;33 and finally, children are usually 
harmed by a long and indefinite stay in foster care.34 Each of these as-
sumptions can conflict with another, however, and identifying an ana-
                                                                                                                      
31 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 305(b), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 629b(a)(9) (2006)) (providing that state plans must “[contain] assurances that 
. . . the safety of the children to be served shall be of paramount concern”). See Kathleen S. 
Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 322–23 (2005). 
32 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 117 (stating that “[c]hildren have an interest in main-
taining a bond with their parents and other family members and are terribly injured when 
this bond is disrupted. The reason for limiting state intrusion in the home, therefore, is 
not only a concern for parental privacy, but also the recognition that children suffer when 
separated from their parents and community”); see also Ex Parte D.J., 645 So. 2d 303, 305 
(Ala. 1994) (citing Striplin v. Ware, 36 Ala. 87, 89–90 (1860)) (stating that “[t]he law de-
volves the custody of infant children upon their parents, not so much upon the ground of 
natural right in the latter, as because the interests of the children, and the good of the 
public, will, as a general rule, be thereby promoted”); Bean, supra note 31, at 322–23; 
Gordon, supra note 9, at 652–54 (noting that the reasonable efforts provision in AFSA 
minimizes the chances children will suffer a harmful separation from their parents). 
33 Gordon, supra note 9, at 654–55 (noting that “an abusive parent assaults psychologi-
cal as well as physical health, ultimately destroying the child’s ability to feel safe, wanted, 
and loved”); see In re J.W., 578 A.2d 952, 958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“When parents act in 
accordance with the natural bonds of parental affection, preservation of the parent-child 
bond is prima facie in the best interest of the child, and the state has no justification to ter-
minate that bond. On the other hand, a court may properly terminate parental bonds 
which exist in form but not in substance when preservation of the parental bond would con-
sign a child to an indefinite, unhappy, and unstable future devoid of the irreducible 
minimum parental care to which that child is entitled.”); see also Bean, supra note 31, at 
322–23. 
34 Gordon, supra note 9, at 655 (“Recent empirical work confirms . . . that long periods 
of multiple [foster] placements or ‘drift’ will be seriously harmful. Even in a loving, long-
term foster home, the uncertainty of . . . foster care . . . may cause hardship.” (internal 
footnote omitted)); see In re Guardianship of DMH, 736 A.2d 1261, 1270 (N.J. 1999) (con-
cerning children who had been in long term foster care: “a delay in establishing a stable 
and permanent home will cause harm to both these children”); Bean, supra note 31, at 
322–23; Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare and Welfare Reform: The Implications for Children 
When Contradictory Policies Collide, 9 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 413, 463 (2003) (noting 
the “potential negative consequences of foster care”). 
2009] Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts & ASFA 229 
lytical approach that yields consistent and appropriate results for 
abused and neglected children is the challenge. 
I. Background: State Legislative and Judicial  
Responses to ASFA 
 Because ASFA explicitly charged the states with the task of defin-
ing aggravated circumstances, a quick survey of state legislative and ju-
dicial responses to this delegation provides context for this discussion.35
A. State Legislation 
 With some exceptions, state legislative definitions model the fed-
eral legislation by providing lists of circumstances or conduct that can 
constitute aggravated circumstances.36 Some closely adhere to the 
ASFA language and say no more; the Georgia statute allows a bypass of 
reunification efforts when “[t]he parent has subjected the child to ag-
gravated circumstances which may include but need not be limited to 
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse.”37 Most in-
clude some version of the examples in the federal provision.38 Beyond 
that, however, the legislation varies greatly and demonstrates the need 
for a focused inquiry on the meaning of aggravated circumstances.39
 Some listed provisions are very specific.40 For example, those of 
North Dakota declare that reasonable efforts are not required when 
the parent “[h]as been incarcerated under a sentence for which the 
latest release date is: (1) [i]n the case of a child age nine or older, after 
the child’s majority; or (2) [i]n the case of a child, after the child is 
twice the child’s current age, measured in days.”41 Moreover, Utah law 
                                                                                                                      
35 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 
Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)) (“[R]easonable 
efforts . . . shall not be required . . . if the parent has subjected the child to aggravated 
circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited 
to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse)”) (emphasis added). 
36 See generally Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
Reasonable Efforts to Preserve or Reunify Families and Achieve Permanency for 
Children: Summary of State Laws (2006), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/system 
wide/laws_policies/statutes/reunifyall.pdf (summarizing the conditions under which rea-
sonable efforts are required by state law). 
37 Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-58(a)(4)(A) (2008). 
38 See generally Child Welfare Info. Gateway, supra note 36 (listing when reasonable 
efforts to reunify a family are not required under the provisions of ASFA). 
39 See id. at 7–45 (listing aggravated circumstances unique to certain state laws). 
40 See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-02(3)(b) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-
312 (3)(d)(i)( J) (2008). 
41 N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-02(3)(b). 
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permits the termination of reunification efforts when “[t]he parent 
permitted the child to reside . . . at a location where the parent knew or 
should have known that a clandestine laboratory operation was lo-
cated.”42 Other provisions are more encompassing.43 South Dakota law 
allows termination when a parent has “subjected the child or another 
child to torture, sexual abuse, abandonment for at least six months, 
chronic physical, mental, or emotional injury, or chronic neglect.”44
 In addition, some of the qualifying circumstances are defined by 
parental conduct and some by the effect of the conduct on the child; 
some exceptions use both.45 States that include provisions requiring 
only that the parent has subjected the child to certain parental conduct 
include Missouri, where no reasonable efforts are required if the par-
ent “has subjected the child to a severe act or recurrent acts of physical, 
emotional or sexual abuse toward the child.”46 Oklahoma includes 
chronic drug abuse as a ground for denying reunification efforts, with-
out regard to the effect on the child.47
 On the other hand, many states refer to the effect of the circum-
stances.48 A South Dakota provision concerning chronic drug and al-
cohol abuse states that reasonable efforts are not required when the 
parent “[h]as a documented history of abuse and neglect associated 
with chronic alcohol or drug abuse.”49 A Nevada provision similarly 
refers to the effect of the parental conduct: no reasonable efforts are 
required when the parent “[c]aused the abuse or neglect of the child 
. . . which resulted in substantial bodily harm to the abused or ne-
glected child.”50 Under Arizona law, no reasonable efforts are required 
when “a child is the victim of serious physical or emotional injury by 
the parent.”51 A Florida provision encompasses result by not requiring 
                                                                                                                      
42 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312 (3)(d)(i)( J). 
43 See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(3) (2008). 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-846 (2007); Fla. Stat. § 39.521(1)(f)(3) (2008); Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 211.183(7)(1) (West 2004); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.393(3)(a)(2) (2006); 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 7003-4.6(13) (West 2007); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(6). 
46 Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.183(7)(1). 
47 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 7003–4.6(13) (“The parent . . . of the child has a history 
of extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted treatment for 
this problem during a three-year period immediately prior to the filing of the deprived 
petition which brought that child to the court’s attention.”) 
48 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-846; Fla. Stat. § 39.521(1)(f)(3); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 432B.393(3)(a)(2); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(6). 
49 S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(6). 
50 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.393(3)(a)(2). 
51 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-846. 
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reasonable efforts when the parent has engaged in “egregious conduct” 
that “threatens the life, safety, or physical, mental, or emotional health 
of the child or the child’s sibling.”52
 Other states use “aggravated” as an adjective to suggest that the 
harm or detriment needs to be substantial, either inherently or in its 
effect.53 For example, New Jersey law considers whether the parent has 
“subjected the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse.”54 North 
Carolina’s statute also emphasizes the aggravated aspect in its defini-
tion: “Any circumstance attending to the commission of an act of abuse 
or neglect which increases its enormity or adds to its injurious conse-
quences, including, but not limited to, abandonment, torture, chronic 
abuse, or sexual abuse.”55
 Several states favor the fairly encompassing “subjected the child to” 
language of ASFA.56 Some provisions explicitly include circumstances 
involving another child or sibling; some do not.57 For example, Alaska 
includes an exception for when the parent has “subjected the child to 
circumstances that pose a substantial risk to the child’s health or safety; 
these circumstances include abandonment, sexual abuse, torture, 
chronic mental injury, or chronic physical harm.”58 South Dakota uses 
close to the same language, but also includes other children.59
 Most state legislative provisions focus on current or past conduct 
when defining aggravated circumstances and list parental conduct, or 
results of parental conduct, that qualify.60 Many, however, include a 
general provision or catch-all phrase that focuses on, or explicitly en-
compasses, the future of the child.61 In effect, this latter group of stat-
                                                                                                                      
 
52 Fla. Stat. § 39.521(1)(f) (incorporating by reference § 39.806(1)(f)–(l) (2008)). 
53 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4C-11.2, 11.3 (West 2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(2) 
(2007). 
54 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4C-11.2, 11.3. 
55 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(2). 
56 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086(c)(1) (2008); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1 
(2008). 
57 See Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086(c)(1); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1. 
58 Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086(c)(1). 
59 S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(3) (stating that reunification is not required when 
a parent has “subjected the child or another child to torture, sexual abuse, abandonment 
for at least six months, chronic physical, mental, or emotional injury, or chronic neglect if 
the neglect was a serious threat to the safety of the child or another child”). 
60 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-846 (LexisNexis 2007); Fla. Stat. § 39.521(1)(f)(3) 
(2008); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 211.183(7)(1) (West 2004); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 432B.393(3)(a)(2) 
(2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7003-4.6(13) (West 2007); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-
21.1(6). 
61 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9–27–303(6)(A) (West 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 17(a)-112(j)(1) (West 2006); Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i)(2), (3) (incorporated by refer-
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utes requires the state to consider whether remediation will be effec-
tive.62 For example, under New Mexico’s statute, a court may find that 
reasonable efforts are not warranted when “the efforts would be fu-
tile.”63 North Carolina states that reasonable efforts are not required 
when “[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent 
with the juvenile’s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home 
within a reasonable period of time.”64 Connecticut provides that courts 
may terminate parental rights without reasonable efforts if the “parent 
is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”65 Arkansas 
allows bypass of reasonable efforts when “a determination has been 
made by a judge that there is little likelihood that services to the family 
will result in successful reunification.”66 Iowa requires the state to estab-
lish, in addition to physical or sexual abuse or neglect, that the “abuse 
or neglect posed a significant risk to the life of the child or constituted 
imminent danger to the child” and that there is “clear and convincing 
evidence that the offer or receipt of services would not correct the 
conditions which led to the abuse or neglect of the child within a rea-
sonable period of time.”67
B. Judicial Responses 
 State courts have also tried to define aggravated circumstances.68 
Opinions in two cases, one from an appellate court and one from a trial 
court, illustrate some of the issues.69 In the first, State v. Risland, the 
parents claimed that the trial court improperly relieved child protective 
services from making reasonable efforts to reunite the child and par-
ents.70 A unanimous panel of the Oregon Court of Appeals found that 
the circumstances of the case qualified for the state’s aggravated cir-
                                                                                                                      
ence in § 232.57(2)(b) (Supp. 2008)); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4–22(C)(1) (West 1999); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2007). 
62 See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(6)(A); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17(a)-112(j)(1); 
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i)(2), (3) (incorporated by reference in § 232.57(2)(b)); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-22(C)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1). 
63 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-22(C)(1). 
64 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1). 
65 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17(a)-112(j)(1); see also § 17(a)-111b(b)(1) (incorporating 
by reference § 17(a)-112(j)). 
66 Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(6)(A). 
67 Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i)(2), (3) (incorporated by reference in § 232.57(2)(b)). 
68 See, e.g., In re Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 189–90 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2005); State v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
69 See Smith, 896 A.2d at 189–90; Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. 
70 Risland, 51 P.3d at 699. 
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cumstances exception.71 The 2002 opinion illustrates the relationship 
of the aggravated circumstances to the future of the child before the 
court.72
 Risland involved a nine-year-old child, the youngest of three chil-
dren.73 The applicable Oregon statute defined aggravated circum-
stances as “including, but not limited to” seven specific or groups of 
circumstances, such as “[t]he parent has subjected any child to inten-
tional starvation or torture.”74 It also included ASFA’s other discretion-
ary exceptions, including when there has been a prior involuntary ter-
mination of parental rights or when a parent has committed murder or 
involuntary manslaughter of another one of his or her children.75 The 
Risland facts did not fit into any of the enumerated examples, however, 
and the court was faced with defining aggravated circumstances gener-
ally.76
 The court initially focused on the operative phrase, examining first 
the meaning of “aggravate.”77 It looked at the dictionary definition—
“to make worse, more serious, or more severe: INTENSIFY” —and at the 
specific circumstances listed in the statute.78 Relying on plain meaning 
and the canon of ejusdem generis, the court concluded that “aggravated” 
circumstances “are those involving relatively more serious types of harm 
or detriment to a child.”79
                                                                                                                      
 
71 Id. at 699, 706. While the Oregon Court of Appeals in Risland did not specifically re-
fer to ASFA, the same court noted in a later decision that the Oregon legislature had 
adopted its aggravated circumstances provision in response to ASFA. State v. Williams, 130 
P.3d 801, 804 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (“In response to ASFA, the Oregon legislature enacted 
Senate Bill (SB) 408 (1999) . . . [which] sets out three categories of circumstances where a 
court may excuse . . . reasonable efforts to make possible the child’s return home . . . .”). 
72 See Risland, 51 P.3d at 705–06. 
73 Id. at 699. 
74 Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.340(5) (2007); Risland, 51 P.3d at 703–05. 
75 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.340(5); Risland, 51 P.3d at 703–04. 
76 See Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. 
77 See id. 
78 Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 41 (unabr. ed. 
1993)). 
79 Id. at 705 (citing State v. Johnston, 31 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)) (“[U]n-
der [the] principle of ejusdem generis, the general category will partake of the same charac-
teristics as the specifically enumerated examples.”). In Modern Statutory Interpretation, the 
authors explain the doctrine of ejusdem generis as “[w]hen general words in a statute pre-
cede or follow the designation of specific things . . . , the general words should be con-
strued to include only objects similar in nature to the specific words.” Linda Jellum & 
David Charles Hricik, Modern Statutory Interpretation: Problems, Theories, and 
Lawyering Strategies 159 (2006). The authors also note that ejusdem generis is a species 
of another canon, noscitur a sociis. Id. Noscitur a sociis requires that “the meaning of words 
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 The court then looked at the plain meaning of “circumstances” — 
defined as “the total complex of essential attributes and attendant ad-
juncts” —and concluded that a court could consider not only the par-
ents’ conduct, but also the “results of those actions and conditions, in-
cluding effects, direct and indirect, on [the] child.”80 The court also 
noted that the specifically enumerated circumstances in Oregon’s stat-
ute that could constitute aggravated circumstances “may be found in 
regard to ‘any’ child,” not only the child before the court.81
 The court considered a number of circumstances, including the 
parents’ problems and conduct.82 The opinion noted the parents had a 
history of drug abuse—another child was born with methamphetamine 
in his system, the mother was convicted of methamphetamine posses-
sion and driving under the influence, and the father had been con-
victed of several felonies “including drug manufacture, weapons posses-
sion, and child neglect.”83 In addition, the children had witnessed 
domestic violence between their mother and her boyfriend, and the 
father had been convicted of assault based on a domestic violence inci-
dent with his girlfriend.84 The court then looked at the effects of the 
conduct—the current and past harms—first, to a sibling, who had “suf-
fered severe mental injury as a result of his exposure to significant do-
mestic violence, the parents’ drug use, and a highly unstable home 
life.”85 It then recounted the harms to the child before the court, not-
ing that he had “suffered serious psychological and social damage in-
cluding, among other disorders, posttraumatic stress disorder, opposi-
tional defiant disorder, and parent-child relational disorder,” and that 
the “disorders were caused, in substantial part, by the parents’ con-
duct.”86
 The factor that seemed to distinguish the circumstances before the 
court as appropriate for an aggravated circumstances exception, how-
ever, was what the court deemed a second “aggravated” circumstance— 
                                                                                                                      
that are placed together in a statute . . . be determined in light of the words with which 
they are associated.” Id. at 151. 
80 Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. 
81 Id. The court also noted that the Oregon legislature listed two “circumstances” that 
could involve the parent’s unintentional conduct: specifically, parental neglect resulting in 
either a child’s death, or in a serious physical injury. Id. Accordingly, the court did not 
consider aggravated circumstances to be limited to a parent’s intentional conduct toward a 
child. Id. 
82 See id. at 699–706. 
83 Id. at 699. 
84 Id. at 699, 700, 706. 
85 Risland, 51 P.3d at 705–06. 
86 Id. at 706. 
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that “the parents’ harmful actions and conditions persist[ed], despite 
extensive efforts to remediate them before the court assumed jurisdic-
tion.”87 Without explicitly doing so, the court predicted that the child 
before the court would be harmed by reunification efforts because the 
parents’ prior failures predicted future failures.88 The court thus con-
cluded the trial court was authorized to allow the child protection 
agency to deny reasonable reunification efforts.89
 The Oregon Court considered a fairly typical statute in a fairly 
logical manner.90 It also had before it a set of facts that was not atypical 
for an abuse and neglect case.91 To distinguish a situation that might 
not otherwise fit within the aggravated circumstances exception, how-
ever, the court emphasized not only the conduct of the parents and 
how it contributed to the serious problems of the child, but also that 
attempts to remediate the parents’ problems failed in the past.92
 A 2005 Delaware family court decision similarly discussed how reli-
ance on past or current circumstances—the narrow fact of prior invol-
untary terminations of parental rights—can be insufficient when sort-
ing out cases for which reasonable efforts may be inappropriate.93 In In 
re Division of Family Services v. Smith, the Delaware child protection 
agency asserted the involuntary termination of parental rights excep-
tion as a basis for denying reasonable efforts for a mother who had two 
earlier terminations, in 2001 and 2002.94 The court expressed concern 
about a prior involuntary termination being used to deny reasonable 
efforts in a current case, indicating that such a waiver might effectively 
result in denying parental rights to a parent who “has instituted major 
positive changes in their life between the first involuntary termination 
of the child and subsequent court proceedings involving another 
child.”95
 Like the Oregon court’s opinion in Risland and its focus on the 
failure of prior efforts to remediate problems, the Delaware family 
court decision implicitly acknowledged that prior terminations of pa-
                                                                                                                      
87 Id. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Risland, 51 P.3d at 703–06. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. at 706. 
93 See Smith, 896 A.2d at 188–90. 
94 Id. at 187–88. The particular focus of the trial court was a separation of powers issue: 
namely, whether the agency or the court had the authority to make the decision of 
whether or not to pursue reasonable efforts. Id. at 189–90. 
95 Id. at 189. 
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rental rights are relevant to the reasonable efforts decision because a 
parent’s prior failures presumably predict future failure.96 Thus, at-
tempting to reunite a child with a parent who has a prior involuntary 
termination would likely cause harm to the child involved in the reuni-
fication efforts.97 Like the Oregon court, however, the Delaware court 
noted that relying on a past circumstance, without considering addi-
tional and relevant present circumstances, could result in a denial of 
reasonable efforts when such efforts would be appropriate, such as “[i]f 
this case involved circumstances in which [the parent] . . . had now im-
proved considerably her parenting skills and ability to provide adequate 
and loving care to her child.”98 However, the court noted that “the 
mother in this particular action is not such a parent . . . .”99
 Both the Oregon appellate and the Delaware trial court opinions 
reflect the core issue concerning any discretionary exception to the 
reasonable efforts requirement: the likelihood of harm to the child be-
fore the court and specifically the harm that may result from an at-
tempt to reunite the child with his or her parents.100 This same con-
cern is evident in the legislative history of ASFA.101
II. Congressional Intent and Legislative Context for ASFA’s 
“Aggravated Circumstances” 
 It is plain that Congress meant for the states to provide their own 
definitions of the aggravated circumstances exception.102 While the 
language of the exception provides some examples, it also states that 
aggravated circumstances “need not be limited” to these examples.103 
The legislative history emphasizes this.104 For example, U.S. Senator 
Mike DeWine (R-OH) declared: 
 Mr. President, let me point out now very carefully so there 
is no risk of misinterpretation on this floor. . . . The authors of 
                                                                                                                      
96 See id. at 190. 
97 See id. 
98 See Smith, 896 A.2d at 190. 
99 Id. 
100 See id.; Risland, 51 P.3d at 706. 
101 See infra Part II. 
102 See Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 
111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)) (instructing 
“aggravated circumstances [to be]. . . defined in State law”). 
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S12,670 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
DeWine). 
2009] Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts & ASFA 237 
this legislation do not—do not—intend these specified items 
to constitute an exclusive definition of which cases do not re-
quire reasonable efforts to be made. 
 Rather, these are examples—these are just examples—of 
the kind of adult behavior that makes it unnecessary, that 
makes it unwise, makes it simply wrong for the Government to 
make continued efforts to send children back to their care. 
This is not meant to be an exclusive list. We make this clear in 
the text of the bill. 105
 Additional understanding, however, requires a closer look. While 
the specific language of the aggravated circumstances exception is in-
structive, some of the broader aspects of ASFA, along with its related 
legislative history, provide a better beginning for identifying how deci-
sion-makers can single out the parent-child relationships for which states 
should be able to deny reunification efforts. These include ASFA’s em-
phasis on the health and safety of the child, ASFA’s retention of the 
“reasonable efforts” requirement, and the immediate legislative context 
of the aggravated circumstances exception.106
A. The Health and Safety of the Child Under ASFA 
 “[I]n determining reasonable efforts to be made[,] . . . the child’s 
health and safety shall be the paramount concern . . . .”107 Thus begins 
ASFA’s “Clarification of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement.”108 Legis-
lative history underscores the strength of Congress’s resolve to protect 
the health and safety of children and also identifies the ways Congress 
perceived those health and safety issues were created or exacerbated.109 
Two concerns repeatedly surface.110 First, required reunification efforts 
were resulting in children being returned to dangerous homes, homes 
that “present[ed] too great a risk” to the health and safety of the chil-
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 See infra Part II(A)–(B). 
107 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2006)). 
108 Id. 
109 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. H10,788–89 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Pomeroy); Improving the Well-Being of Abused and Neglected Children: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 104th Cong. 1, 1 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine) 
[hereinafter Abused and Neglected Children Hearing]. 
110 See 143 Cong. Rec. H10,788–89 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Pomeroy). 
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dren.111 Second, required reunification efforts were also responsible 
for too many children spending too many years in foster care while 
states made “fruitless attempts to reunify certain families that simply 
cannot be fixed.”112 Ironically, the second of these concerns, lengthy 
stays in foster care, was a motivating factor in the initial adoption of the 
reasonable efforts provision.113
 Congress’s determination to make paramount the health and 
safety of children in dependency proceedings has been consistently 
recognized by the state courts since ASFA’s enactment.114 One Con-
necticut trial court judge called ASFA’s “health and safety shall be 
paramount” clause the “mantra” of ASFA.115 A New York Family Court 
judge referred to “ASFA’s unequivocal statement of public policy that 
children must be protected from depraved parental conduct.”116 A 
Delaware Family Court judge stressed the health and safety provision of 
ASFA: “[C]hildren’s safety . . . must be the paramount concern of all 
child welfare decision-making. . . . [T]he safety of the child and the 
child’s need for permanency are the foremost concerns . . . . To stress 
the importance of the safety principle, ASFA states explicitly that child 
health and safety is the paramount consideration.”117
                                                                                                                      
111 Id. 
112 Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 1 (statement of Sen. 
DeWine). 
113 See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten 
Years Later, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 223, 224 (1990). For five years before passing the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980(AACWA), Congress heard testimony about the 
foster system’s treatment of abused and neglcted children, and found that 
[t]he most striking fact presented was the astonishing number of children 
who were being removed from their families and placed in foster care, many 
for the entire duration of their childhoods. . . . While lost in a system that 
could neither return them to their families nor place them with adoptive par-
ents, these children often moved from foster home to foster home, becoming 
more and more disturbed with each move. 
Id. 
114 See, e.g., In re Sheneal W. Jr., 728 A.2d 544, 552 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999); In re 
Rasheta D., No. 98-08-07-TN, 2000 WL 1693157, at *20 (Del. Fam. Ct. Mar. 2, 2000); In re 
Custody & Guardianship of Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 834 (Fam. Ct. 1999), aff’d, 741 
N.Y.S.2d 207, 213(App. Div. 2002), aff’d, 795 N.E.2d 21, 30 (N.Y. 2003). 
115 In re Sheneal W. Jr., 728 A.2d at 552. 
116 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 834. The court’s opinion noted “[t]he impact of . . . 
ASFA’s mandates is so obvious that the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was influenced by it 
in a termination of parental rights case decided even before that state passed its imple-
menting legislation.” Id. at 834 n.9 (citing In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1998)). 
117 In re Rasheta D., 2000 WL 1693157, at *20. 
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1. AACWA and Reasonable Efforts 
 The phrase “reasonable efforts” was first evoked in the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), when Congress re-
sponded to concerns about “foster care drift” and “foster care limbo.”118 
Both were familiar terms in the debate about when the states should 
pursue adoptions for abused and neglected children and when the 
states should attempt to reunite these children with their parents.119 
AACWA was designed to address the prevailing belief that states were 
placing too many children in foster care and leaving them there, while 
failing to make sufficient efforts to reunite those children with their 
families.120 AACWA required states receiving federal foster care fund-
ing to make reasonable efforts to keep children in their homes, and, if 
removal was necessary, to make reasonable efforts to return the chil-
dren to their homes.121 While AACWA included provisions supporting 
adoption, the thrust of the Act was keeping children with their fami-
lies.122 States were required to provide “child welfare services,” which 
were defined in a way that made keeping children with their families 
presumptive and primary.123 The health and safety of children, beyond 
                                                                                                                      
 
118 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–272, 
94 Stat. 500, 503 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Bean, 
supra note 31, at 321; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principle, 4 J. L. 
& Fam. Stud. 151, 158 (2002). Woodhouse explained the meaning of foster care drift, in 
that: 
[t]ypically, [foster families] are urged to avoid becoming too attached or al-
lowing the child to become too attached, so as to avoid disrupting bonds with 
the biological family with whom the child will be reunited. 
  . . . Many [foster] children have spent the bulk of their lives moving from 
temporary foster placement to foster placement—a syndrome critics have de-
scribed as “foster care drift.” These children suffer developmental and emo-
tional damage from a loss of trust in adults and from a lack of stability and 
continuity. 
Id. In addition, “[f]oster care limbo refers to the existence of children who live in foster 
care for lengthy periods of time. Limbo results when a foster care child cannot be safely 
returned home; yet he or she is not free for adoption because the state has not terminated 
the parent-child relationship.” Sherry A. Hess, Note, Texas Family Code Section 263.401: Im-
proving the Mandatory Dismissal Deadline to Be Truly in the Best Interest of the Child, 9 Tex. 
Wesleyan L. Rev. 95, 98 (2002) (internal footnotes omitted). 
119 Woodhouse, supra note 118, at 158–59. 
120 See Shotton, supra note 113, at 223–25. 
121 AACWA § 101(a)(1). 
122 See id. 
123 Id. The Act defined “child welfare services” to mean 
public social services which are directed toward the accomplishment of the 
following purposes: (A) protecting and promoting the welfare of all children 
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general references to protecting the welfare of children, were not ex-
plicitly mentioned.124
 For a while, AACWA appeared to succeed as the number of chil-
dren in foster care decreased.125 By 1997, however, when ASFA was en-
acted, the number had returned to its 1977 level, three years prior to 
AACWA.126 As the numbers rose, many in the child protective services 
field expressed concerns to Congress, most of which were pegged to 
AACWA’s reasonable efforts requirement.127 Some argued the reason-
able efforts requirement was not the problem, but rather that the ser-
vices provided to the families were inadequate “due to chronic under-
funding and mismanagement of child welfare agencies and courts.”128 
In effect, they argued that states were failing to comply with the reason-
able efforts provision.129 More influential with Congress, however, were 
                                                                                                                      
 
. . . ; (B) preventing or remedying, or assisting in the solution of problems 
which may result in, the neglect [or] abuse . . . of children; (C) preventing the 
unnecessary separation of children from their families by . . . preventing breakup of the 
family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible; (D) restoring to 
their families children who have been removed, by the provision of services . . . ; (E) 
placing children in suitable adoptive homes, in cases where restoration to the biological 
family is not possible or appropriate; and (F) assuring adequate care of children 
away from their homes, in cases where the child cannot be returned home or 
cannot be placed for adoption. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
124 See id. 
125 Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A Reflection on the First Three Years of 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act Implementation, 39 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 25, 27 
(2001) (citing Thomas P. McDonald et al., Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Fos-
ter Care: A Research Synthesis 15 (1996)) (reporting that the foster care population 
was 276,000 in 1985); Shotton, supra note 113, at 224 (citing Edna McConnell Clark 
Found., Keeping Families Together: The Case for Family Preservation 1 (1985)) 
(noting a foster care population as high as 502,000 in 1977). 
126 See Gendell, supra note 125, at 25. 
127 Celeste Pagano, Adoption and Foster Care, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 242, 243 (1999). The 
Department of Health and Human Services did adopt regulations listing services that 
could be provided for reasonable efforts, but the regulations did not define what consti-
tuted “reasonable.” See id. at 243–44. 
128 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family: Unified Family Courts and the 
Child Protection Dilemma, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2099, 2114 (2003) [hereinafter Developments in 
the Law]; see also Theresa Glennon, Walking With Them: Advocating for Parents With Mental 
Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 273, 278 (2003) (not-
ing that advocates for parents argued “that the family services provided were often inade-
quate or of poor quality” and “social supports to keep a family together were not avail-
able”). 
129 See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 347–48 (1992) (ruling that—where child 
beneficiaries brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials 
arguing that the state had failed to provide reasonable efforts to prevent removal of chil-
dren from their homes and to reunite families where children had been removed—the 
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charges that reunification efforts were being pursued at the expense of 
the children’s safety or psychological well-being,130 resulting in children 
continuing to be left in foster care for too long and children being re-
turned to unsafe homes.131
2. The Concerns about Reasonable Efforts 
 As early as 1993, four years before ASFA was signed into law, Con-
gress held hearings on “reasonable efforts.”132 During these hearings 
and throughout ASFA’s legislative journey, Congress heard from and 
responded to witnesses concerned that reunification efforts were being 
made in situations where it was unreasonable—where homes could 
never be made safe for children.133 Always the concerns were two: re-
turning children to unsafe homes and keeping children in foster care 
for too long.134
 Among those appearing before Congress were Connie Binsfeld, 
then Michigan’s Lieutenant Governor, and Peter Digre, then Director 
of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Ser-
vices. Binsfield told Congress that states were making reasonable efforts 
in “egregious” situations, that children were either being left in dan-
gerous homes or “they [are] taken out of the home and put in foster 
care and delayed and delayed in foster care while all of the services to 
rehabilitate the parents [are] going on.”135 Digre argued to committee 
members in the House of Representatives that “[t]he word ‘reasonable’ 
                                                                                                                      
plaintiffs had no enforceable private right under the reasonable efforts provision of 
AACWA). 
130 See Michael J. Bufkin, The “Reasonable Efforts” Requirement: Does It Place Children at In-
creased Risk of Abuse or Neglect?, 35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 355, 374 (1997) (“Ironically, the 
emphasis on family preservation means abused children linger in foster homes while social 
workers try to repair hopelessly dysfunctional families.”). 
131 See Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America’s Disposable 
Children: The Evolution of Federal Funding Statutes for Foster Care from 1961 to Present, 17 Int’l 
J.L. Pol’y & Fam. 211, 222 (2003). Courts were criticized for refusing to remove children 
from their sometimes dangerous homes because reasonable efforts had not been made to 
keep the children there; they were also criticized for refusing to terminate parental rights 
when reasonable efforts to reunite had not been made. See id. The former resulted in chil-
dren being left in homes where they might be harmed; the latter resulted in children be-
ing left in foster care, “without the hope of a plan for permanency.” See id. 
132 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 867, supra note 21, at 48–50. 
133 See id. at 48–49. 
134 See id. 
135 Barriers to Adoption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hum. Resources of the H. Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 37 (1996) (statement of Mich. Lt. Gov. Binsfeld) [hereinafter 
Barriers to Adoption Hearing]. Binsfeld also stated it “would be very helpful to the States if 
[Congress would] define ‘reasonable efforts.’” See id. 
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is often read out of ‘reasonable efforts[,]’ creating a situation in which 
children are placed in danger and re-abused in the name of family 
preservation and reunification. . . . In short, we too often engage in ‘fu-
tile efforts’ which are inherently unreasonable.”136 Digre talked about 
foster care as “tragically unstable” and urged Congress to “[r]ecognize 
. . . that there are classes of parents for whom ‘reasonable efforts’ and 
family preservation and reunification are or may be inherently unrea-
sonable.”137 Examples provided by Digre included “parents who kill or 
maim children,” “parents who aggressively sexually assault children,” 
“parents with histories of violent criminal behavior,” “parents who 
abandon children in life-threatening circumstances,” and “parents with 
long-term and chronic addictions.”138
 Helen Leonhart-Jones, then Executive Director of Montgomery 
County Children Services in Dayton, Ohio, also noted “there are some 
parents for who[m] all our best efforts will never be enough,” and ar-
gued for “clearly identified criteria” to allow the professionals to bypass 
reasonable efforts for those parents.139 Leonhart-Jones, like others, 
listed certain situations that so clearly fit these criteria that they should 
be exempt from reunification efforts, for example, “[p]arents with his-
tories of violent criminal behavior or domestic violence.”140
 Members of Congress responded with like concerns and commen-
tary. Representative Tim Roemer talked about the “two major prob-
lems” in the foster care system: “[Too often we] reunite our children 
with their families only to find catastrophe to happen later on that 
week or that month when that child was abused again. . . . The second 
problem is now we have too many children languishing in foster care 
situations.”141 Upon introducing the early Senate version of ASFA,142 
Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI) indicated that the goals of his bill were 
twofold: to “ensure that abused and neglected children are in safe set-
tings, and to move children more rapidly out of the foster care system 
                                                                                                                      
136 Id. at 114 (statement of Peter Digre, Director, L.A. County Dep’t of Children & 
Family Servs.). 
137 Id. at 116. 
138 Id. 
139 Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 52 (statement of Helen 
Leonhart-Jones, Executive Director, Montgomery County Children Servs.). 
140 Id. 
141 143 Cong. Rec. H2018–19 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roemer). 
142 The Safe Adoptions and Family Environments Act (S. 511) was an earlier version of 
ASFA. See 143 Cong. Rec. S2701 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997). 
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and into permanent placements.”143 Senator DeWine, a self-proclaimed 
strong and early supporter of legislation to clarify reasonable efforts, 
referred frequently to the problem of foster care limbo and returning 
children to dangerous homes—problems he saw as exacerbated by the 
reasonable efforts requirement.144 DeWine also talked about social 
workers’ concerns and perceptions that reunification efforts were still 
required, “even when . . . everybody with any common sense would 
know there is not one chance in a million that we are ever going to be 
able to fix that family.”145
 In addition, witnesses and members of Congress alike related ac-
counts or referenced news reports of heartbreaking stories of children 
removed from foster homes prematurely and of children who suffered 
horrific crimes or died by the hands of, or in the care of, parents to 
whom the states had returned them.146 Child advocate Leonhart-Jones 
told of a seven-year-old boy she worked with in Cincinnati, who died 
after falling from a third story window while he was at home, unsuper-
vised, with his three-year-old brother.147 Representative Barbara Ken-
nelly referred to “the terrible, heartbreaking case with little Emily in 
Michigan” and “other cases across these United States, headlines telling 
us the very worst can happen.”148 Senator Chafee pointed to the noto-
rious abuse and death of Sabrina Green149 and Senator DeWine related 
the tragic story of Elisa Izquierdo.150 Both girls’ families were being 
                                                                                                                      
143 See id. The bill excepted several situations from the requirement of reasonable ef-
forts: where the parent has committed a Child Abuse and Prevention Act Amendments of 
1996 (CAPTA) criminal act; where the parent is found “to have abandoned, tortured, 
chronically abused, or sexually abused the child”; and where returning the child to the 
home would “endanger the child’s health or safety.” Id. at 2702. It also acknowledged that 
states could specify the cases where, “because of circumstances that endanger the child’s 
health or safety,” no reasonable efforts were required. Id. 
144 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S11,175 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1997); 143 Cong. Rec. S10,262–
63 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1997). Senator DeWine was a co-sponsor of S. 511, the Safe Adoptions 
and Family Environments Act, which was introduced March 20, 1997. 143 Cong. Rec. 
S2701 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1997). Just a month before, on February 27, 1997, Representa-
tives Dave Camp and Barbara B. Kennelly introduced the House bill that eventually be-
came ASFA. See Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong.; Encouraging Adop-
tion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th 
Cong. 4–5 (1997); see also Pagano, supra note 127, at 242 (stating that Representative E. 
Clay Shaw was also a co-sponsor of the Adoption Promotion Act). 
145 Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 13–14 (statement of Rep. DeWine). 
146 See id. 
147 See, e.g., Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 52 (testimony of 
Leonhart-Jones). 
148 143 Cong. Rec. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997). 
149 143 Cong. Rec. S12,526 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997). 
150 Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 10–11. 
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monitored by child protective services at the time of their deaths.151 
Sabrina’s body “was found with fractured skull and a gangrenous sev-
ered thumb.”152 Time magazine reported the police as saying, in refer-
ence to Elisa, that, “there was no part of the six-year-old’s body that was 
not cut or bruised.”153 In addition, child advocate Richard Gelles’s The 
Book of David is credited with “galvaniz[ing] support for ASFA.”154 The 
book tells the story of David, whose sister had been removed from the 
home because of severe abuse by David’s parents.155 David was also re-
ported twice as abused, but was left with his parents.156 Ultimately, his 
mother suffocated him.157 These and other similarly tragic stories are 
credited with influencing Congress’s response to the reasonable efforts 
provision of AACWA.158
 While members of Congress seemed to give the most attention to 
decisions that returned children to danger or death in their homes, they 
also faulted the system for leaving children in foster care for too long.159 
                                                                                                                      
 
151 Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom 
Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 155, 183–84 (1999). 
152 Id. at 183. 
153 David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate, Time, Dec. 11, 1995, at 32 available at http:// 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,983842,00.html. But see Will L. Crossley, Defin-
ing Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 259, 274 (2003) (reporting that “Elisa’s family was never in a family pres-
ervation program, so the problem that led to her death was not attributable to attempts by 
the state to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family”) (citing Nina Bernstein & Frank 
Bruni, She Suffered in Plain Sight but Alarms Were Ignored, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1995, at A1). 
154 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 115. 
155 Bufkin, supra note 130, at 375 (citing Richard J. Gelles, The Book of David: 
How Preserving Families Can Cost Children’s Lives 1–7 (1996)). 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See Bridget A. Blinn, Focusing on Children: Providing Counsel to Children in Expedited 
Proceedings to Terminate Parental Rights, 61 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 789, 818 (2004); see also 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192–93 (1989) (noting 
that the state had temporary custody of Joshua but returned him to his father even though 
the caseworker observed “a number of suspicious injuries” in the next six or seven months; 
Joshua’s father eventually beat the four-year-old so severely that he suffered permanent 
and severe brain injury); Crossley, supra note 153, at 273–74 (recounting the stories of 
fifteen-month-old David, who was killed by his mother despite reports to child protective 
services and a prior voluntary termination of parental rights because case manager did not 
feel the state made reasonable efforts; of six-year-old Elisa, who was killed by her mother 
after years of substantial abuse because case manager failed to remove her despite not 
being subject to the reasonable efforts requirement; and of Joseph, who was to be removed 
from his mother’s care, but was returned home and subsequently killed by her when the 
county lost his records). 
159 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S3947–48 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
DeWine); 143 Cong. Rec. S12,673, S12,675 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statements of Sen. 
Craig, Sen. Jeffords, & Sen. Moynihan); see also David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable 
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Prior to AACWA, agencies were charged with not doing enough to re-
unite parents and children, and thus the children were languishing in 
foster care.160 After AACWA, the result was the same, but now agencies 
were said to be trying too hard to reunite children with their families, 
and the blame was placed on the reasonable efforts requirement.161
 Senator DeWine, for example, complained in May 1997 that abu-
sive parents were being given a “second chance, a third chance, a 
fourth chance, a fifth chance, and on and on, to get their lives back to-
gether.”162 Meanwhile, “their poor little children are shuttled from fos-
ter home to foster home, spending their most formative years deprived 
of what all children should have—a safe, stable, loving, and permanent 
home.”163 Congressman Earl Pomeroy emphasized the uncertainty fos-
ter children live with and suffer from: 
In some instances, abused children live daily with the fear that 
they may be sent back by some people in some process they 
do not begin to understand into a home where the abuse oc-
curred in the first place. They do not even go to bed at night 
with the sense of personal safety and security.164
 Finally, while ASFA’s legislative history does not reveal an explicit 
emphasis on cost effectiveness, common sense points to the wisdom of 
conserving scarce resources for reunification efforts that have a chance 
                                                                                                                      
Efforts Requirement in Termination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures 
of the State Child Welfare System, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 139, 144–50 (1992) (discussing the de-
velopmental harm that children experience from long-term placement in foster care); 
Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for Removal of 
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of 
Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 644–46 (1976) (discussing the potential harms associ-
ated with foster care). 
160 See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text. 
161 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. H10,776–89 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Pomeroy); 143 Cong. Rec. S3947–48 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
162 143 Cong. Rec. S3947–48 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
163 Id. Senator DeWine told of twins who were placed in foster care when their mother, 
who had “serious substance abuse problems” abandoned them. Id. at S3947–48. While 
reunification efforts resulted in a decision to reunite the children and parent, this result 
took three and one-half years to come about. Id.; see also 143 Cong. Rec. S12,673, S12,675 
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Craig) (noting that the system is “trapping 
[children] in what was supposed to be ‘temporary’ foster care, instead of moving them 
into permanent homes”); (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (“Too often, children languish in 
foster care for years—years—before they find a safe, loving family.”); (statement of Sen. 
Moynihan) (“[ASFA] . . . accelerates the process for determining the permanent place-
ment for a child in foster care, so that children do not spend years bouncing among foster 
homes.”). 
164 143 Cong. Rec. H10,789 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy). 
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of working, and for using them to benefit children, not harm them.165 
As Cristine Kim wrote in her oft-cited student note, “[r]easonable ef-
forts has its optimal effect if made with respect to parents who are not 
‘bad’ but have external problems or parents who may be ‘bad’ but ex-
hibit a sincere desire and clear potential to change.”166
 The reallocation of resources made possible from being able to 
deny reasonable efforts in certain circumstances has not escaped the 
notice of state courts.167 The Pennsylvania Superior Court commented, 
shortly after ASFA was enacted, on the serious and costly problems that 
foster care creates.168 Quoting a U.S. News and World Report article enti-
tled Adoption Gridlock, the court discussed the “cost to the taxpayer” of 
using foster care for long-term placements “rather than as a pass 
through program, as originally intended.”169 The article explained that 
“[k]eeping these kids stuck in temporary homes is not only devastating 
to the kids—it has been a fiscal disaster.”170 The Maine Supreme Judi-
cial Court also emphasized the economic considerations two years later, 
in a 2000 prior involuntary termination of parental rights case: 
 The State also has a legitimate interest in making the best 
use of its limited resources. . . . [T]he Department’s resources 
are limited and in many instances are insufficient even to 
meet the needs of parents who are able and willing to work on 
the impediments to the return of their children. . . . If diffi-
cult decisions regarding allocation of scarce resources must be 
made, the Legislature’s determination that a prior involuntary 
termination is a factor to be considered is both reasonable 
and legitimate.”171
In 2003, the South Dakota Supreme Court commented that one of the 
effects of ASFA is that “the child protection system is not required to 
expend its limited resources attempting to reunify children with abu-
sive parents if certain circumstances exist,” and under these circum-
                                                                                                                      
165 See Burt, supra note 22, at 314. 
166 Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back Into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in 
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 287, 314. 
167 See, e.g., In re Heather C., 751 A.2d 448, 456 (Me. 2000); In re Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 
334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); People ex rel. D.B., 670 N.W.2d 67, 70 (S.D. 2003). 
168 See In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 334 (noting “a serious and costly problem in human lives 
and public monies relating to the grid lock of foster care in this country”). 
169 Id. at 335. 
170 Id. 
171 In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 456. 
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stances, states can move “more efficiently” toward termination of pa-
rental rights.172
3. ASFA’s Clarification and Retention of Reasonable Efforts 
 Although Congress continued the reasonable efforts requirement 
in ASFA, it also responded to the criticisms that reasonable efforts were, 
under AACWA, too often “unreasonable,” and that children were too 
often being subjected to dangerous homes or lengthy foster care 
stays.173 It thus took care to include language emphasizing the primacy 
of the health and safety of the children, and it also included several spe-
cific provisions designed to limit the reasonable efforts requirement.174
 Congress first required state plans to “[contain] assurances that . . . 
the safety of the children to be served shall be of paramount con-
cern.”175 Congress then emphasized this hierarchy by liberally sprin-
kling “safe,” “safety,” and “safely” throughout the applicable provisions 
of the United States Code.176 Under AACWA, for example, reasonable 
efforts were required “to make it possible for the child to return to his 
home.”177 Under ASFA, reasonable efforts are required to make it pos-
sible for children to “safely return” to their homes.178 AACWA also re-
quired states to make reasonable efforts to return children to their 
homes “in each case.”179 A centerpiece of ASFA’s clarification of rea-
sonable efforts is its provision allowing states to deny reunification ef-
forts in three categories of circumstances.180
                                                                                                                      
172 People ex rel. D.B., 670 N.W.2d at 70; see also In re Ashley, 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 
2000) (“[T]he Act gives courts the discretion to identify the most egregious cases, from early 
stages of the child protection process . . . without providing fruitless reunification ser-
vices.”); In re I.H., 674 N.W.2d 809, 812 (S.D. 2004) (“ASFA provides an exception to the 
reasonable efforts requirement in cases where the court determines that a parent has sub-
jected a child to ‘aggravated circumstances’ as defined by state law.”). 
173 See supra Part II(A)(2). 
174 See, e.g., ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, §§ 101(a), 305(b), 111 Stat. 2115 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 629b(a)(9), 671(a)(15)(B)(ii), (D)(i)–(iii) (2006)); see 
also Sanders, supra note 131, at 227 (noting that “ASFA has not abandoned the family pres-
ervation model, but merely subordinated it to child safety”); Developments in the Law, supra 
note 128, at 2116 (“Under current policy a child’s health and safety is the primary con-
cern.”). 
175 ASFA § 305(b), 42 U.S.C. § 629b(a)(9). 
176 Id. §§ 622, 675 (titled “Including Safety In Case Plan And Case Review System Re-
quirements”). 
177 AACWA of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–272, § 471(a)(15), 94 Stat. 500, 503 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
178 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii). 
179 AACWA § 101(a). 
180 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii). 
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 One exception incorporates the Child Abuse and Prevention Act 
Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA).181 CAPTA had already identified sev-
eral criminal acts that would release states from required reasonable 
efforts, for example, where the parent had committed murder of an-
other child of the parent or committed a felony assault resulting in a 
serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent.182 A 
second exception releases states from required efforts when the paren-
tal rights of the parent to a sibling of the child have been terminated 
involuntarily.183
 The aggravated circumstances exception makes reasonable efforts 
discretionary where “the parent has subjected the child to aggravated 
circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include 
but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and 
sexual abuse).”184 Each of ASFA’s exceptions, including the aggravated 
circumstances exception, identifies past or current circumstances that 
operate not only to rebut the presumption of reasonable efforts being 
in the child’s best interests, but also to trigger a presumption that seri-
ous harm or detriment will result to the child if reunification efforts are 
attempted.185 While the harm can be a return to a dangerous home, 
Representative Clay Shaw recognized these exceptions as an important 
part of the response to lengthy foster stays and their threat to children’s 
safety: “If families will not or cannot change within a reasonable period 
of time, we must, in the interest of the children, be willing to terminate 
parental rights and move expeditiously toward adoption.”186 Represen-
                                                                                                                      
181 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA), Pub. L. 
No. 104–235, § 107(b)(2)(A)(xii), 110 Stat. 3063 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5101–5109 (Supp. V 2005)). 
182 Id. Reasonable efforts are not required where the parent has committed certain 
criminal acts: murdered or committed voluntary manslaughter of another child of the 
parent; aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit a murder or volun-
tary manslaughter of another child of the parent; or committed a felony assault that re-
sulted in a serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the parent. ASFA § 101(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii). 
183 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
184 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
185 See Herring, supra note 2, at 337 (noting the state is excused from attempting to re-
unify the family and that the law presumes that the parent is unfit); see also Sallie K. 
Christie, Note, Foster Care Reform in New York City: Justice for All, 36 Col. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 
1, 4–5 (2002). If a parent has committed a CAPTA criminal act, ASFA requires the state, 
with some exceptions, to file a termination of parental rights (TPR) petition. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5)(E). The same requirement does not apply to the prior TPR or aggravated cir-
cumstances exceptions, however. See id.; see also infra notes 193–194 and accompanying 
text. 
186 143 Cong. Rec. H2015–16 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw). 
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tative Shaw went on to explain that “[w]e do this by allowing States to 
define what we call aggravated circumstances that allow them to dis-
pense with services for the family and get on with the business of find-
ing an adoptive home for the child.”187
 In connection with the reasonable efforts exceptions, Congress 
took precautions to ensure the primacy of health and safety.188 It in-
cluded its own statutory construction rule, applicable to the reasonable 
efforts requirement, providing that “[n]othing in this part shall be con-
strued as precluding State courts from exercising their discretion to 
protect the health and safety of children in individual cases, including 
cases other than those [exempted from reasonable efforts].”189
 Finally—and significantly—Congress took additional steps to pro-
tect the emotional and psychological well-being of children who were 
spending too much of their childhoods in “temporary” foster care, by 
directing states to focus on finding, more quickly, permanent situations 
for these children.190 If reasonable reunification efforts are denied (or 
discontinued), ASFA also requires the states to expend reasonable ef-
forts “to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the perma-
nent placement [including adoption] of the child.”191 Along with this, 
Congress shortened the timeline for dispositional or “permanency” 
hearings from eighteen months to twelve months, requiring states to 
decide more quickly whether a child will go back to his or her parents 
or be placed for adoption (thus necessitating a termination of parental 
rights).192 In addition, Congress shortened the time for reasonable ef-
                                                                                                                      
187 Id. Representative Shaw’s remarks were about the Adoption Promotion Act of 
1997—an earlier version of ASFA, which also required that a TPR petition be filed if a 
child younger than ten had been in foster care for eighteen of the most recent twenty-four 
months. Id. at H2024; Adoption Promotion Act (APA) of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. 
§ 3(a)(3)(E). See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 9 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2737, 
2741. 
188 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A). 
189 Id. § 678. Section 101(d) of ASFA states that the rule of construction amends Part E of 
title IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670–679 (and thus it applies to the reasonable efforts provision and the 
exceptions to the reasonable efforts provision). Id. Robert Gordon suggests that while this 
provision allows states to deny reasonable efforts in cases other than those explicitly excepted 
in ASFA, a parent could still demand a judicial hearing authorizing the denial of services. 
Gordon, supra note 9, at 680 n.250 (citing ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D), which 
provides that “reasonable efforts . . . shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent 
of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that” one of the exceptions 
exists). 
190 See ASFA §§ 101(a), 302, 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(C), 675(5)(C). 
191 Id. § 671(a)(15)(C). 
192 See id. § 675(5)(C). A legal guardianship or another planned permanent living ar-
rangement may also be part of the “permanency plan” for the child. Id. § 675(1)(E). 
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forts by requiring a termination of parental rights petition to be filed if 
a child is in foster care for “15 of the most recent 22 months,” if the 
child is an abandoned infant, or if any of the subsection (ii) of section 
671(15)(D) (CAPTA criminal acts) circumstances exist.193 In each of 
these situations, the state is required, with some exceptions, to file a 
termination of parental rights petition and move towards adoption.194 
Finally, to complement this emphasis on permanency, Congress also 
heightened and provided support for adoptions, including adoption 
incentive payments, concurrent planning (placing children in their 
pre-adoptive homes while reasonable efforts are on-going), and specific 
requirements to identify and approve families for adoptions.195
 The multiple provisions in ASFA targeting lengthy foster stays em-
phasize the concern Congress had about the threat of these stays to the 
health of children.196 Interpreting aggravated circumstances, then, in 
line with the broader legislative provisions and aims of ASFA, requires 
recognizing not only the risk of harm that comes from children being 
returned to dangerous parents, but also the risk of delayed or denied 
permanence that comes from long and uncertain stays in foster care. It 
also requires recognizing one additional harm—that which is inflicted 
on a child when parental rights to that child are terminated. 
 The reasonable efforts requirement was meant to preserve families 
and to prevent terminations of parental rights.197 Central to any analysis 
of aggravated circumstances is reading each of ASFA’s exceptions as it is 
presented—as a part of the “Clarification of the Reasonable Efforts Re-
quirement.”198 Although most of the commentary in the legislative his-
tory focuses on circumstances when reasonable efforts should not be 
made, a sprinkling of specific comments confirm the underlying agree-
ment on the rationale behind reasonable efforts.199 Senator DeWine 
stated that “[f]amily reunification is very important. It is a laudable 
goal[;] we all want to try that.”200 Representative Dave Camp explained 
                                                                                                                      
193 Id. §§ 671(15)(D)(ii), 675(5)(E); see CAPTA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–235, 
107(b)(2)(A)(xiii), 110 Stat. 3063. 
194 ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(E) (requiring that the state “concurrently . . . iden-
tify, recruit, process, and approve a qualified family for adoption”). 
195 Bean, supra note 31, at 328. 
196 Id. at 327–29. 
197 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 8 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2739, 2740; Bean, 
supra note 31, at 325. 
198 ASFA § 101. 
199 See Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 41; H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 8; 143 
Cong. Rec. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Camp). 
200 Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 41. 
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that “[ASFA] calls upon States to continue efforts to reunite the fam-
ily.”201 More explicit is the House Report on ASFA, which addresses “the 
importance and essential fairness of the reasonable efforts criterion” 
and instructs that ASFA does not seek to effect “a wholesale reversal of 
reasonable efforts.”202 “Rather than abandoning the Federal policy of 
helping troubled families, what is needed is a measured response to al-
low States to adjust their statutes and practices so that in some circum-
stances States will be able to move more efficiently toward terminating 
parental rights and placing children for adoption.”203 ASFA’s emphasis 
on permanency, in fact, fully encompasses the rationale for reasonable 
efforts—to “minimiz[e] the likelihood that [children] will suffer harm-
ful separation from their parents.”204
 States thus retain the discretion to provide reunification services 
when appropriate, even when an exception applies.205 Representative 
William Goodling highlighted this discretionary aspect when discussing 
the CAPTA criminal acts exceptions, noting the amendments are “in-
tended to give the States flexibility in this area. . . . States may still seek 
to reunify the family, but will no longer be required to do so by Federal 
law.”206 State courts have also recognized this distinction by consistently 
speaking of the “discretion” to deny reasonable efforts when consider-
ing the bypass provisions.207 The New Mexico Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the “discretionary nature of the statute” in a 2002 termination of 
parental rights case, noting that New Mexico’s statute “does not man-
date that the state cease reasonable efforts once there has been a prior 
termination of parental rights. . . . [Our ASFA statute] provides the trial 
court with discretion to relieve the state of the burden of providing ser-
vices.”208 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court also emphasized the dis-
                                                                                                                      
 
201 143 Cong. Rec. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Camp) (addi-
tionally noting that “in some cases reunification is not in the child’s best interest”). 
202 H.R. Rep. No. 105-77, at 8. 
203 Id. 
204 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653; see also Sanders, supra note 131, at 227 (noting that 
ASFA does not abandon the family preservation model, but “merely subordinate[s] it to 
child safety and permanency timeline goals”). 
205 In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 455; see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 
824 A.2d 213, 234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003), aff’d in part, modified in part, and re-
manded, 845 A.2d 106, 121 (N.J. 2004); In re L.N., 689 N.W.2d 893, 897–98 (S.D. 2004). 
206 142 Cong. Rec. H11,152 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Goodling). 
207 See, e.g., In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 455; State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families 
Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 849 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002). 
208 Amy B., 61 P.3d at 849. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that “[w]hen the court 
finds aggravated circumstances exist, it is well within its discretion to order the cessation of 
reunification services”). In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“[ASFA] provides 
the court with discretion to determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or elimi-
252 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:223 
tinction, noting that Maine’s ASFA statute “is written to allow, but does 
not mandate, that the Department be relieved of its responsibilities.”209 
Still, a discussion of whether an exception applies usually takes place 
only when the state seeks to deny reunification efforts. In this sense, 
they are one and the same. 
B. The Immediate Legislative Context of the Aggravated  
Circumstances Exception 
 Words are known by the company they keep.210 The aggravated 
circumstances exception keeps company with two others, the CAPTA 
criminal acts exception (murder, manslaughter, and so forth) and the 
prior involuntary termination of parental rights (TPR) exception.211 
How these exceptions operate is instructive in several ways.212 They first 
suggest that Congress intended states to be able to deny reasonable ef-
forts only with evidence of an act or circumstance that was meant to 
inflict or did inflict a very serious harm or detriment on a child.213
 The CAPTA circumstances are particularly serious, in part because 
of their immediacy.214 The extremes in this exception include murder, 
defined by the United States Code as “the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforethought,” and voluntary manslaughter, “the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice[,] [u]pon a sudden 
quarrel or heat of passion.”215 The harm resulting from a felony assault 
is similarly serious and justifies the termination of reunification efforts 
if committed against the child or another child of the parent.216 Gen-
erally, a crime is classified as a felony when the punishment is impris-
onment for more than one year, and the felony circumstance also re-
                                                                                                                      
nate the need for removing the child from the home or to preserve and reunify the family 
shall be made or continue to be made when the court finds aggravated circumstances exist.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also In re R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). 
209 In re Heather C., 751 A.2d at 455. 
210 Jellum & Hricik, supra note 79, at 151. 
211 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(ii)–(iii)(2006)); CAPTA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, § 107(A)(II)(xii), 
110 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(xii) (Supp. V 2005)). 
212 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
213 Id. 
214 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii). 
215 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1112(a) (2006). The CAPTA criminal acts exceptions in ASFA 
note specifically the United States Code definitions for murder and voluntary manslaugh-
ter—for example, reasonable efforts are not required if the parent has “committed murder 
(which would have been an offense under section 1111(a) of Title 18).” ASFA § 101(a), 42 
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(I)–(II). 
216 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(IV). 
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quires, by definition, that the assault result in “serious bodily injury.”217 
The final CAPTA circumstance is simply an extension of the murder 
and voluntary manslaughter provisions, that is, when a parent has 
aided, abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited to commit the mur-
der or voluntary manslaughter.218
 The involuntary TPR exception similarly captures only very serious 
harms or circumstances.219 A termination of parental rights can be said 
to inflict two harms on a child.220 In addition to the severance of the 
parent-child relationship, the child is harmed by the circumstances that 
justify the termination.221 The termination of parental rights has been 
                                                                                                                      
 
217 Model Penal Code § 1.04(2) (1962) (“A crime is a felony if . . . persons convicted 
thereof may be sentenced [to death or] to imprisonment for a term that . . . is in excess of 
one year.” (brackets in original)). The phrase “serious bodily injury” was defined in 
CAPTA to mean “bodily injury which involves substantial risk of death, extreme physical 
pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” CAPTA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-235, 
§ 107(b)(4)(B), 110 Stat. 3036 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(4)(B) (Supp. 
V 2005)). Under the Model Penal Code, ASFA’s felony assault provision would probably fit 
within the definition of aggravated assault, which includes: “causes [a serious bodily injury 
to another] purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.” Model Penal Code § 211.1(2)(a). A section 
211.1(2)(a) aggravated assault under the Model Penal Code is a second degree felony. Id.; 
see also In re Janet J., 666 N.W.2d 741, 751 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a spiral frac-
ture of the leg of the child involved “a substantial risk of disfigurement or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of that leg and was therefore a serious bodily injury”), dis-
approved of on other grounds by In re Jac’Quez N., 669 N.W.2d 429, 435 (Neb. 2003); Brown v. 
Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 S.E.2d 214, 218 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (construing “fel-
ony assault resulting in serious bodily injury” as being concerned with the effect the crime 
had on the child). 
218 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(ii). Congressional Record references to the 
1996 CAPTA amendments further indicate that Congress was focused on very serious cir-
cumstances. See 142 Cong. Rec. H11,148–53 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996). The listed excep-
tions were adopted, according to Representative William Goodling, to prevent “overzeal-
ous attempts of ‘family preservation’” that place “children back into homes where parents 
have been convicted of egregious acts.” Id. (statement of Rep. Goodling) (emphasis added). 
219 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(15)(D)(iii). 
220 See Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental Rights 
Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 397, 414–15 (1996). 
221 Id. The “immensely influential” writings by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, Albert 
Solnit, and Sonja Goldstein on the best interests of the child have persuaded most profes-
sionals in the field that “disrupting the parent-child relationship seriously hurts children of 
all ages.” Gordon, supra note 9, at 652–53 (noting that the work had been “harshly criti-
cized for its lack of empirical support, among other things,” but that the “work is nonethe-
less compelling in view of what is now known”); see also Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of 
Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Pro-
ceedings, 11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 176, 221–22 (2004); Blinn, supra note 158, at 812–13. 
One author asserts, with some justification, that AACWA, in fact, “was based on the prem-
ise that removal of a child from his or her home was so harmful to his or her psyche that it 
was virtually never in the child’s best interests to be removed.” Pagano, supra note 127, at 
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characterized as a civil “death penalty” by many state courts, and thus 
requires a substantial justification.222 Legislative examples of grounds 
for termination include (a) abandonment; (b) abuse or neglect; (c) un-
fitness of the parent; (d) parent’s failure to provide child support; (e) 
mental or physical disability of the parent; (f) incarceration of the par-
ent; (e) risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury to the child; 
and (f) dependency.223 In most states, a termination must be supported 
by clear and convincing evidence224 showing that the parent is unfit225 
and, additionally, that the termination is in the best interest of the 
child.226 In other words, the harm that justified the termination is, by 
definition, very serious.227
 Moreover, CAPTA and CAPTA-like acts can also be the basis for an 
involuntary termination of parental rights, and thus ASFA’s TPR excep-
tion predicts and protects against these same harms.228 But termina-
tions additionally occur because of ongoing and chronic circum-
                                                                                                                      
243. The argument about the tipping point, however, remains: when does the harm the 
parent is subjecting the child to constitute a greater harm than that which the severance of 
the parent-child relationship will inflict? See Blinn, supra note 158, at 813. 
222 State ex rel. S.A.C., 938 So. 2d 1107, 1109 (La. Ct. App. 2006): In re P.D., 144 S.W.3d 
907, 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Parental Rights as to K.D.L. 58 P.3d 181, 186 (Nev. 
2002); In re A.C., 827 N.E.2d 824, 831 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 329; In 
re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 811 (Tex. App. 2002). While the grounds for termination are 
many and varied, it is generally recognized that an involuntary termination of parental 
rights interferes with the right of a parent to the care, custody and management of his or 
her child. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing the “funda-
mental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 
child”). 
223 See generally John DeWitt Gregory et al., Understanding Family Law 183–91 
(3d ed. 2005). 
224 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; see In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330–31 (noting that the trier 
of fact must “come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts 
in issue”). 
225 See, e.g., Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 Va. L. Rev. 635, 678 (2002) (stating the 
Court’s analysis in Santosky “endorsed a high, unfitness-based standard”); see also In re Lilley, 
719 A.2d at 329 (Pennsylvania requires clear and convincing evidence, and petitioner must 
prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such in-
capacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, 
control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 
cannot or will not be remedied”). 
226 See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making 
About Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 845, 955–56 (2003); S. Adam Fergu-
son, Note, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of Parental Rights, 22 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 85, 93 (2007). 
227 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–48; In re Lilley, 719 A.2d at 329–31; Buss, supra note 
225, at 678; Dwyer, supra note 226, at 955–56; Ferguson, supra note 226, at 93. 
228 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2006)). 
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stances.229 Consequently, it is important to ask what harms these trig-
gering circumstances are designed to protect against. The immediate 
effect of the harm inflicted on a child returned to a chronic situation, 
while sufficient to require state intervention, is often not as serious as 
that in a CAPTA circumstance. Further, the parents may have more of 
an opportunity to show change and not merely compliance. Parents 
who have neglected a child as a result of a drug addiction, for example, 
may be able to submit test results to show they are no longer doing 
drugs. While not proving lasting change, the evidence does establish a 
drug-free status quo and may suggest a diminished risk to the child 
should reunification occur. Finally, if the parent relapses, the state may 
be able to intervene before the harm to the child becomes too serious 
and irreparable. These types of harms, by themselves, are not necessar-
ily serious enough to trigger an exception to the requirement of rea-
sonable reunification services. 
 If, however, chronic abuse or neglect circumstances have been an 
issue, and such that they resulted in a termination of parental rights— 
which is the measurement of harm recognized by ASFA’s TPR excep-
tion—the parent apparently failed to remediate, even when faced with 
the loss of parental rights. Thus, even if the current circumstances are 
such that the child before the court can be removed before a serious or 
irreparable harm accrues, the parent’s involuntary termination of pa-
rental rights with another child predicts that such a removal will be 
necessary, that the parent will lapse in his or her remediation, and thus, 
the child will be subject to a lengthy and uncertain foster stay. 
 In addition, the CAPTA and TPR exceptions suggest that the harm 
triggering the exception for the child before the court can be deriva-
tive.230 But for the CAPTA felony assault circumstance, which can in-
volve either the child before the court or another child, the other cir-
cumstances in the CAPTA and TPR exceptions involve only “another 
child” of the parent.231 The risk of harm to the child currently before 
the court, should the state make efforts to reunite parent and child, is 
most often predicted by a very serious harm inflicted upon another 
child.232 This type of presumption is not new to abuse and neglect law. 
                                                                                                                      
229 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Melvin, 885 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he 
mother’s marginal improvement in parenting skills despite her long-time involvement with 
the department showed that her unfitness was highly likely to continue into the indefinite 
future.”). 
230 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
231 Id. 
232 See, e.g., In re K.O., 933 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
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 In 1996, a year before ASFA, the Missouri Court of Appeals cap-
tured the concern that a parent who has caused severe harm to one 
child will cause severe harm to another child.233 In In re K.O., the 
mother argued that the termination of her parental rights to two chil-
dren, based on her murder of a stepsibling, was not supported by clear, 
cogent, and convincing evidence, as required by law.234 “The termina-
tion of parental rights of an abusing parent under this subsection,” said 
the court, “is premised on the belief that requiring the child to suffer 
the fate of his or her sibling (or step-sibling) prior to termination of the 
rights of the abusing parent would defeat the purpose of the law.”235 A 
New York Family court articulated the implicit qualifiers that often go 
with this belief and assumption: the abuse must be serious, not too re-
mote in time, and demonstrative of a fundamental defect in the par-
ent’s understanding of his or her duties.236 If these circumstances exist, 
a court need not “‘await broken bone or shattered psyche before ex-
tending its protective cloak around [a] child.’”237
 Further, in In re Marino S., the New York courts emphasized not 
only the validity of derivative abuse, but also ASFA’s recognition of de-
rivative abuse and harms.238 Marino involved only one child who was 
directly abused, but the trial court relied on this abuse to deny reason-
able efforts for the child’s siblings.239 The trial court noted that the 
“premise” of ASFA encompasses the reasoning of derivative abuse by 
assuming that “in certain types of cases, . . . the dangers of reunification 
efforts often outweigh any potential benefit.”240 On appeal, the Appel-
late Division affirmed.241 It too commented on the derivative nature of 
ASFA’s discretionary bypass provisions, noting that one of ASFA’s “goals 
was to prevent the return of a child to unrehabilitated abusive or ne-
glectful parents, and, to that end, the Act created categories of cases in 
which ‘reasonable efforts’ to provide for a return of the child to the 
parent(s) were not required.”242 Finally, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, also affirming, relied on both the validity of derivative findings 
                                                                                                                      
233 See id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 934 (citing In re P.M., 801 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)). 
236 DSS ex rel. Moria I. v. Manuel S., 563 N.Y.S.2d 592, 596 (Fam. Ct. 1990). 
237 Id. at 596–97 (quoting In re Maria Anthony, 366 N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (Fam. Ct. 1975)). 
238 In re Marino S., 795 N.E.2d 21, 29 (N.Y. 2003) aff’g 741 N.Y.S.2d 207, 207 (App. Div. 
2002) aff’g 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 834 (Fam. Ct. 1999). 
239 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831. 
240 Id. 
241 In re Marino, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 211. 
242 Id. 
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and ASFA’s recognition of derivative harms.243 The court noted that a 
“derivative [finding] of severe abuse may be ‘predicated upon the com-
mon understanding that a parent whose judgment and impulse control 
are so defective as to harm one child in his or her care is likely to harm 
others as well.’”244 Further, the Court of Appeals emphasized that ASFA 
was meant to expedite permanency planning for abused children by 
allowing the agency to be excused from expending “considerable effort 
in preparing an obviously unfit parent for permanent placement.”245
 If the aggravated circumstances exception is interpreted consis-
tently with the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, then it may be triggered 
only with evidence of a very serious harm. That harm may have been 
directed at either the child before the court or another child of the 
parent. These triggering harms are the central and defining feature of 
the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, but their purpose is to protect the 
child before the court from the harms they predict. Thus, understand-
ing the harms the CAPTA and TPR exceptions predict is also helpful. 
 The CAPTA criminal acts exception most frequently predicts that 
one of two very serious harms will occur if reunification efforts are at-
tempted. The child will either be returned to a dangerous home or will 
linger in foster care. In most CAPTA circumstances, the parent has 
shown the capacity to inflict a very serious harm, often instantaneously. 
A parent who has demonstrated the capacity to murder his or her own 
child, for example, predicts not only a very serious risk to the subject-
child if the child is returned to parent, but a risk that has little warning 
or opportunity for the state to remove the child if the parent acts again. 
In addition, given the nature of the risk associated with most CAPTA 
acts, it is more difficult for parents to assure the state that they have 
successfully remediated their problem. The situation thus also risks 
leaving the child in foster care for too long. 
 A 2005 “shaken baby” case in South Dakota reflected both of these 
dangers.246 An eight-month-old boy and his sister were removed from 
the mother after the boy suffered life-threatening injuries.247 After the 
children were placed in foster care, the mother contacted the child 
                                                                                                                      
243 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28. 
244 Id. at 28 (quoting In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831). But see Robert May, Note, De-
rivative Neglect in New York State: Vague Standards and Over-Enforcement, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. 
Probs. 605, 613–14 (2007) (criticizing the similar “fundamental defect” or “fundamentally 
flawed” standard). 
245 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 26. 
246 In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d 841, 843 (S.D. 2005). 
247 Id. 
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protection agency to inquire about regaining custody of her chil-
dren.248 The agency provided a plan requiring that the mother address 
parenting, anger management, and visitation.249 The trial court ulti-
mately found the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite 
the mother with her children, but that the circumstances were “aggra-
vated,” thus releasing the state from the reasonable efforts require-
ment.250 The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
holding and termination of parental rights.251
 The risk the court recognized most was that of returning the child 
to the mother.252 The court noted that the caseworker believed the chil-
dren would be at risk if they were returned and relied on the case-
worker’s testimony that “even though” the mother’s assault of the child 
was a “split second poor decision,” it provided a reason “to believe it 
could happen again.”253 The risk of extended foster care in such a situa-
tion was also demonstrated, as the court conceded the mother had 
completed “all that was asked of her” in the reunification plan and that 
she had even “sought out more in an attempt to regain custody of her 
children.”254 However, “just because Mother completed the objectives of 
her [reunification plan] does not establish that Mother would no longer 
be a risk to the safety of the children.”255
 The South Dakota court’s concern has been identified by the child 
welfare expert Richard Gelles as one of distinguishing change from 
compliance.256 Compliance is when the parents have done what they 
have been asked to do—for example, attend an anger management 
class or keep the house clean.257 But social workers, lawyers, and judges 
must make child placement decisions based on “risk and change, not 
simply the passage of time and compliance.”258 Given the serious and 
                                                                                                                      
248 Id. at 844. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. at 844–45. 
251 In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d at 843, 849. 




256 Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 10 (statement of Richard J. 
Gelles). Professor Gelles currently holds the Joanne and Raymond Welsh Chair of Child 
Welfare and Family Violence in the School of Social Policy & Practice at the University of 
Pennsylvania, is the Director for the Center for Research on Youth & Policy, and is Co-
Director of the Field Center for Children’s Policy Practice & Research. University of Penn-
sylvania School of Social Policy & Practice, Richard J. Gelles, PhD., http://www.sp2.upenn. 
edu/people/faculty/gelles/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
257 See Abused and Neglected Children Hearing, supra note 109, at 14. 
258 Id. at 15. 
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irreparable harm that may await a child in a CAPTA-like circumstances 
case, the risk is great.259 If reunification efforts are made, the child 
might be returned to a dangerous home, but equally likely is that the 
child will be kept in foster care for too long, out of fear that the parents 
have merely complied and not changed.260
 The very serious harm that can come from returning a child to a 
home where parents have committed a CAPTA-like act and have not yet 
remediated their problems is apparent.261 The harm that comes from 
placing a child in a foster home is just as serious, however, as it results 
in an extended delay of permanence for the child.262 In many of the 
chronic circumstances, the child may stay in foster care for too long 
because the parents have failed, yet again, to change.263 As stated by the 
California Court of Appeals, 
delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see 
if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, 
might be able to reunify at some future point, does not pro-
mote stability for the child or the child’s best interests. “Child-
hood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”264
In the CAPTA-like situation, the child may stay in foster care because 
the state is waiting to be reassured the parent will not strike again—a 
                                                                                                                      
259 See id. at 11 (recounting the story of a fifteen-month-old boy who was killed by his 
mother despite several reports of physical abuse). 
260 See id. at 10, 13–15. 
261 See id. at 11. 
262 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 655–56. Professor Catherine Ross recognized this harm 
when comparing circumstances she perceived to be “aggravated” to circumstances where a 
child was in foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months. See Ross, supra note 221, at 
196–97. Her comparison assumes that aggravated circumstances are easy to identify and 
generally assumes aggravated circumstances will be more immediately life-threatening and 
thus not involve foster care. See id. at 197. But her comment highlights the different types 
of harms that can be inflicted on a child: 
 Generally, the aggravated circumstances cases are not complex in terms of 
either law or morality. The facts of those cases are so heinous that line-
drawing should not prove difficult. In cases involving “aggravated circum-
stances” the parent has already put the child’s life at risk. In contrast, the 
cases in the second group [foster care for fifteen of the last twenty-two 
months] are not so straightforward. With the passage of time, termination 
becomes more and more likely, and the needs all children have for stability 
and permanence are pitted directly against the claims of their parents. 
Id. 
263 See In re Casey D., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 432 (Ct. App. 1999). 
264 Id. (quoting In re Baby Boy L., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 654, 670 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal 
cites and editing marks omitted)). 
260 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:223 
wait that may never end.265 ASFA recognizes that the lack of perma-
nency that comes with foster care limbo, no matter what the reason, 
almost always endangers a child’s health and safety in a serious and ir-
reparable way.266
 Ultimately, the CAPTA and TPR exceptions protect the child be-
fore the court from two harms—the same two harms Congress consis-
tently recognized when it enacted ASFA: children being returned to 
dangerous homes and children being left in foster care for too long. If 
the aggravated circumstances exception is interpreted as consistent 
with the company it keeps, the exception should apply only (1) when a 
very serious harm has occurred to either the child before the court or 
another child of the parent and (2) when those circumstances suggest 
the risk of either a return to a dangerous home or a too-long foster 
stay.267
 Finally, the presence of the involuntary TPR exception emphasizes 
that the details of the triggering circumstances must be relevant.268 
One criticism of ASFA’s TPR exception is that it applies without regard 
to the circumstances or timing of the termination.269 As explained by 
one child advocate, “[a] parent whose rights to another child were 
terminated when the parent was a teenager, for example, would be de-
prived of services even though, when the parent was older and more 
mature, reunification efforts might be appropriate.”270 While the fear 
behind the criticism is understandable, the exception does not require 
states to deny reunification efforts; it only allows the state to do so.271 If 
the circumstances of the termination of parental rights and the child 
before the court indicate no undue risk of harm to the child, reunifica-
tion efforts should be provided. 
                                                                                                                      
265 See id. 
266 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653–55. 
267 See generally id. (discussing the rationale of ASFA). 
268 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2006)). 
269 See Pagano, supra note 127, at 245 (citing Bill Grimm, ASFA Brings Big Changes, 
Youth L. News 1–2, (1997)) (arguing that an involuntary termination of parental rights 
when a parent was a teenager could be used to deprive the parent of reasonable efforts in 
a current abuse or neglect case when efforts might “be appropriate” given the parent’s 
current age and maturity); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Children’s Interests in a Familial Context: 
Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 1189, 1190 n.4 (1999) (noting that the 
timing and circumstances of a prior termination are irrelevant for determining whether 
the discretionary bypass provision applies). 
270 Pagano, supra note 127, at 245 (citing Grimm, supra note 269, at 1–2); see also In re 
Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 189–90 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2005) (noting a parent 
may have made “major positive changes” since the prior termination of parental rights). 
271 See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
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 The Iowa Court of Appeals, faced with a prior involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights situation, recognized that the circumstances of 
the termination were important to its prognostic value and thus to the 
court’s decision concerning reunification efforts.272 The court affirmed 
the trial court’s denial of reasonable efforts, but only after noting the 
relevant circumstances.273 The time between the prior termination and 
the birth of the child currently before the court was three weeks, the 
mother had been provided with a “‘myriad of services’ prior to the 
termination of her parental rights . . . but was unable to respond to 
them,” and additional services to the mother “offered such a short pe-
riod of time after a previous termination, would not correct the situa-
tion.”274 The court confirmed that both the present circumstances and 
those of the prior termination predicted an undue risk to the child be-
fore the court if reunification efforts were provided.275
 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court similarly recognized that the 
details of the aggravated neglect circumstances were important to the 
prognostic value of those circumstances.276 “As horrifying as the condi-
tions in that apartment were, they must be seen in the context. If 
[these] were first time parents with no resources, and no training, the 
apartment would have been no less appalling but, perhaps, not the ba-
sis for a cease reunification order.”277
 The relevance of circumstances to the prognostic value of a termi-
nation of parental rights is also confirmed by ASFA’s treatment of the 
CAPTA and TPR circumstances in another of its provisions.278 Section 
103(a)(3) of ASFA seeks to speed adoptions and thus permanency for 
children by requiring that states initiate terminations of parental rights 
in certain situations.279 Petitions are generally required, along with con-
current efforts to place the child up for adoption, when the child has 
been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, 
when a court determines that the child is an abandoned infant, or when 
                                                                                                                      
272 See In re E.C.-O., Nos. 0-284, 99-2016, 2000 WL 1028099, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 
26, 2000). 
273 See id. 
274 Id. The mother had “an IQ of 84, and suffer[ed] from schizophrenia, schizoid per-
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275 See id. at *3–4. 
276 In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 948. 
277 Id. 
278 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006)). 
279 See id. 
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the parent has committed any of the CAPTA acts.280 Petitions are not 
required, however, as a result of the parent having an involuntary ter-
mination of parental rights with another child or because the parent has 
subjected the child before the court to aggravated circumstances.281
 That ASFA does not require a petition for the child before the 
court based on the parent already having an involuntary TPR with an-
other child recognizes how important the circumstances of any prior 
terminations can be. It also recognizes that the typical CAPTA circum-
stances, which do require a mandatory termination petition, simply pro-
vide less room for a discretionary decision to return the child to the 
home. With a CAPTA act, the feared harm is very serious and frequently 
instantaneous with its initial infliction, “change” versus compliance is 
hard to confirm, and the state’s ability to prevent the harm if the child is 
returned is slight. A termination of parental rights is a likely outcome 
for the child before the court.282 The prognostic value of a prior TPR, 
however, without considering past and present details, is not as reliable. 
Further, because the circumstances will matter, a decision to provide 
reunification efforts for the child before the court is more likely. 
 The effect of including prior terminations as a basis for an excep-
tion thus emphasizes that states may—and when the circumstances in-
dicate that it is sufficiently safe to do so, should—provide reasonable 
reunification efforts to the family.283
                                                                                                                      
 
280 Id. There are three exceptions. Id. A petition is not required to be filed when: 
 (i) at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative; 
 (ii) a State agency has documented in the case plan (which shall be avail-
able for court review) a compelling reason for determining that filing such a 
petition would not be in the best interests of the child; or 
 (iii) the State has not provided to the family of the child, consistent with 
the time period in the State case plan, such services as the State deems neces-
sary for the safe return of the child to the child’s home, if reasonable efforts 
of the type described in section 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) of this title are required to 
be made with respect to the child. 
Id. 
281 Id.; Martin Guggenheim, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the Family’s Place in Child Wel-
fare Policy, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1716, 1731 n.76 (2000) (reviewing Elizabeth Bartholet, 
Nobody’s Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and the Adoption Alterna-
tive (1999)). 
282 Even in a CAPTA situation, however, a termination of parental rights petition does 
not have to be filed if the child protection agency documents a compelling reason demon-
strating that it would not be in the best interest of the child. ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(E)(ii) (2006). 
283 See In re LN, 689 N.W.2d 893, 898 (S.D. 2004) (concluding that “a court must neces-
sarily consider whether a less restrictive alternative is appropriate in making the bypass 
decision. After all, [the South Dakota statute] does not preclude reunification efforts when 
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 Congress’s decision to omit aggravated circumstances from those 
situations for which a termination of parental rights petition must be 
filed might easily be because Congress left the definition of the phrase 
to the states.284 It might also suggest, however, that Congress thought 
the aggravated circumstances exception, like the involuntary TPR ex-
ception, would encompass a greater number of situations where reuni-
fication efforts would not present an unacceptable risk to the subject-
child and should thus be provided. Regardless, scrutiny of ASFA’s pro-
visions emphasizes that it is the predicted fate of the child before the 
court—not the past or current circumstances in isolation—that matter. 
The exceptions allow, not require, states to deny reasonable efforts. 
III. The Language of the Aggravated Circumstances Exception 
 The aggravated circumstances exception provides that reasonable 
efforts are not required when “the parent has subjected the child to 
aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may 
include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic 
abuse and sexual abuse).”285 The exception, like the Child Abuse and 
Prevention Act Amendments of 1996 (CAPTA) and prior involuntary 
termination of parental rights (TPR) provisions, relies on past circum-
stances to predict future circumstances, specifically harm to the child 
before the court should reunification efforts be made.286 The CAPTA 
and TPR provisions, however, rely explicitly on distinct end-results for 
their circumstances and, except for the felony assault provision, must 
directly involve another child of the parent.287 By contrast, the aggra-
vated circumstance exception relies on a nebulous and abstract situa-
tion: circumstances that are aggravated.288 Additionally, while the cir-
cumstances must involve the child before the court, the directness of 
the child’s involvement is also unclear; that is, the child must be “sub-
jected to” the aggravated circumstances.289
                                                                                                                      
aggravating circumstances are present. Rather, the statute simply provides that if aggravat-
ing circumstances are present, reunification efforts are not required . . . .”); see also supra 
notes 205–209 and accompanying text. 
284 ASFA §§ 101(a), 103(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i), 675(5)(E). 
285 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 
Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)). 
286 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii). 
287 See id. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
288 See id. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
289 See id. 
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 The few state court opinions that include a pointed effort to sort 
out the language of the aggravated circumstances exception have gen-
erally focused on “subjected the child to” and “aggravated circum-
stances.” The examples listed in the statute, “abandonment, torture, 
chronic abuse, and sexual abuse,”290 have received less attention, pre-
sumably because they are merely examples and additionally because 
most court opinions deal with specific state provisions. Still, since they 
are tangible examples of an otherwise abstract exception to reasonable 
efforts, a review is helpful. 
A. Abandonment, Torture, Chronic Abuse, and Sexual Abuse 
 The characteristics of the examples provided by Congress confirm 
that “aggravated circumstances” must begin with, as do the other ex-
ceptions, circumstances that are very serious.291 They also confirm that 
Congress meant the aggravated circumstances exception to prevent the 
same types of harms as the other exceptions—very serious harms that 
(1) are immediate and thus irreparable or (2) come from foster care 
stays that are too long. 
1. Torture 
 The plain meaning of torture, “[i]nfliction of severe physical pain 
as a means of punishment or coercion,” suggests a type of child abuse 
that can inflict immediate harm.292 It also suggests a very serious, ir-
reparable harm.293 For example, Louisiana defines torture in its child 
abuse statutes as “torment, maiming, mutilation, or ritualistic or mali-
cious acts causing extreme and unjustifiable physical or mental pain or 
suffering, disfigurement, or injury.”294 Maryland’s definition is “to 
cause intense pain to body or mind for purposes of punishment or ex-
traction of information or for sadistic purposes.”295 Sending a child 
back to a parent who has tortured a child, even after remedial efforts, 
would likely present “an unacceptably high risk to the health, safety and 
welfare of the child.”296 A “split second” single incident could cause 
                                                                                                                      
290 Id. 
291 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
292 American Heritage College Dictionary 1429 (3d ed. 1993). 
293 See id. 
294 La. Child. Code Ann. art. 1003(14) (2004). 
295 Md. Code Ann. [Cts. & Jud. Proc.] § 3–812(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006). 
296 See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 233 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2003) (defining aggravated circumstances). 
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death or other irreparable injury.297 Further, keeping the child in foster 
care until the state is adequately assured that the parents have changed, 
and not merely complied, would likely deprive the child of the perma-
nency that is critical to protecting the child’s health and safety.298
2. Sexual Abuse 
 Sexual abuse is another type of abuse that can inflict an immedi-
ate, very serious, and irreparable harm.299 Kentucky’s abuse and ne-
glect statute defines sexual abuse as including, but not limited to, “any 
contacts or interactions in which the parent . . . uses or allows, permits, 
or encourages the use of the child for the purposes of the sexual stimu-
lation of the perpetrator or another person.”300 In addition, because of 
the usually secretive and private nature of sexual abuse and the percep-
tion that traditional treatment is ineffective in changing the behavior of 
the abuser, reunification of a child with a parent who has sexually 
abused a child could also be perceived as presenting a risk of reoccur-
rence without a visible warning that would allow a quick removal of the 
child.301 Finally, the foster stay likely required for assuring that the par-
ent has changed, and not merely complied with the reunification plan, 
would also deprive the child of the permanency essential to the child’s 
health and safety.302
3. Chronic Abuse 
 Chronic abuse, similar to torture, can include abuse that inflicts 
very serious harm immediately and irreparably. The modifier that dis-
tinguishes this example is not “severe,” “egregious” or even “very seri-
ous”; instead, it is “chronic.”303 The plain meaning of chronic is “[o]f 
                                                                                                                      
297 See In re E.L. & R.L., 707 N.W.2d 841, 841, 847 (S.D. 2005). 
298 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653–54 (noting that “once in foster care, a child will 
remain there for a long time and experience multiple placements, which in turn cause 
grave harms”). 
299 See Christopher Champagne, Note, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Statutes 
and the Illinois Supreme Court’s Decision in People v. Malchow, 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 301, 
307–07 (2003); Paul Eric Stuhff, Comment, Utah’s Children: Better Protected Than Most by New 
Civil Sex Offender Incapacitation Laws?, 24 J. Contemp. L. 295, 298–301 (1998) (briefly 
summarizing three well-publicized examples of sexual abuse). 
300 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 600.020(54) (West Supp. 2008). 
301 See Champagne, supra note 299, at 307–08; Stuhff, supra note 299, at 302–03. 
302 See Gordon, supra note 9, at 653–54. 
303 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)). 
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long duration; continuing.”304 Oklahoma defines the phrase in its child 
abuse statute to be “a pattern of physical or sexual abuse which is re-
peated or continuing.”305 Beyond “repeated” or “continuing,” chronic 
also suggests intractable or resistant to change.306 For example, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a case involving a termination of pa-
rental rights, explained that “[w]ith respect to the finding of unfitness 
because of chronic substance abuse, this Court has defined the term 
chronic as ‘[w]ith reference to diseases, of long duration, or character-
ized by slowly progressive symptoms; deep seated and obstinate, or 
threatening a long continuance.’”307 Providing reunification efforts for 
a child and parent when the parent has chronically abused the child 
predicts a long foster stay for the child. 
4. Abandonment 
 What Congress intended by abandonment is more difficult to dis-
cern from its plain meaning. In family law, its meaning can range from 
abandoning a newborn infant at a hospital or elsewhere,308 to failing to 
pay child support,309 to failing to visit or otherwise maintain contact.310 
                                                                                                                      
304 American Heritage College Dictionary, supra note 292, at 250. 
305 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 7001-1.3(A)(8) (2007); see also Va. Code. Ann. § 16.1-
281(B) (West 2008) (defining chronic abuse as “recurring acts of physical abuse that place 
the child’s health, safety and well-being at risk”). 
306 See In re Shawn M., 898 A.2d 102, 107 (R.I. 2006). 
307 Id. (citing In re Tara P., 836 A.2d 219, 223 (R.I. 2003). 
308 “Abandoned infant[s]” are explicitly listed in ASFA as circumstances requiring the 
state to file a termination of parental rights petition. ASFA § 103(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5)(E). Because section 675(5)(E) includes some (but not all) circumstances covered 
by section 671(a)(15)(D) (exceptions to reasonable efforts), the difference in phrasing is 
presumably intentional and “abandonment” in section 671(a)(15)(D)(i) is meant to be 
more inclusive than “abandoned infant[s].” ASFA leaves the definition of “abandoned 
infant” to the states. Id. § 675(5)(E). 
309 See Young v. Foster, 252 S.E.2d 680, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that father’s 
“nonpayments were intentional and constituted a voluntary abandonment”); In re R.K.B., 
572 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1998) (discussing legislative intent that termination for non-
payment can occur when nonpayment manifests indifference to the child); Klobnock v. 
Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Iowa 1981). 
310 See In re Roshawn R., 720 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that be-
cause of father’s failure to utilize department of correction services to contact his children 
while incarcerated, the lower court properly found he had abandoned the children); Z.H. 
v. G.H., 5 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (state statute provides that abandonment 
occurs if, without good cause, the parent leaves the child without parental support for a 
period of six months or longer and makes no efforts to visit, although able to do so); see 
also State v. Williams, 130 P.3d 801, 806 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that incarceration, 
without more, does not constitute an aggravated circumstance, and noting that, while in-
carceration of a parent might seem to be included in abandonment “at first glance,” the 
state had not made that argument). 
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In some states, a man’s failure to register on a putative father registry is 
prima facie evidence that he has abandoned his child.311 In addition, 
the distinction between abandonment and child neglect can sometimes 
blur; failing to provide basic care and support for a child can constitute 
either abandonment or neglect.312
 Abandonment in abuse and neglect law, however, normally re-
quires an “intent to relinquish parental claims to the child.”313 As stated 
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, “generally, abandonment is demon-
strated by facts or circumstances that evince a settled purpose to forego all 
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.”314 The court 
went on to say that “[n]on-support does not itself constitute abandon-
ment, especially where the child is supported by a volunteer, but it may 
be an element of abandonment.”315 More recently, the Alabama Court 
of Civil Appeals had to apply Alabama’s statutory definition of aban-
donment in an aggravated circumstances case.316 The statutory defini-
tion included “‘the failure to claim the rights of a parent, or failure to 
perform the duties of a parent.’”317 In spite of the language of the stat-
ute, the court held that “involuntary, unintentional, and/or justifiable 
parental conduct” would not support a finding of abandonment.318
                                                                                                                      
311 Robbin Pott Gonzalez, The Rights of Putative Fathers to Their Infant Children in Con-
tested Adoptions: Strengthening State Laws That Currently Deny Adequate Protection, 13 Mich. J. 
Gender & L. 39, 65, 65 n.155 (2006) (listing Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Utah). 
312 See In re Monique H., 681 N.W.2d 423, 428–29 (Neb. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that 
the findings did not rise to the level of abandonment contemplated by the reasonable 
efforts exception in the Nebraska statute). The court maintained that the trial court 
adjudicated Monique not only on the basis that she is an abandoned child, 
but also on the basis that she lacks proper parental support and parental care. 
In family law, the terms “abandoned” and “abandonment” can include many 
forms of child neglect, and the lines of distinction between the two are not 
always clear, so that failure to support or care for a child may sometimes be 
characterized as abandoning a child and sometimes characterized as neglect. 
Id. at 428. 
313 Gregory et al., supra note 223, at 186. 
314 O.S. v. C.F., 655 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)(emphasis added). 
315 Id. 
316 H.H. v. Dep’t of Human Res., 989 So. 2d 1094, 1103–04. (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). 
317 Id. at 1103 (quoting Ala. Code § 26-18-3(1) (1975)). 
318 Id. at 1103–04. The mother in the case did not have contact with the child protec-
tive services, nor did she physically visit the child between November 2005 and April 2006; 
as such, the juvenile court found that she had “abandoned” her child. Id. at 1097. The 
appellate court concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the 
mother had “intentionally, voluntarily, and unjustifiably failed to claim the rights of a par-
ent; failed to perform the duties of a parent; or withheld her presence, care, love, protec-
tion, maintenance, or the opportunity for the display of filial affection.” Id. at 1104. 
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 To the extent that abandonment is separate from traditional 
abuse, neglect, and failure to care situations, it would likely be a parent 
who has, without good cause or excuse: left a child, or left a child with 
someone, and failed to return; failed to maintain contact with the 
child; or otherwise failed to do what is necessary to keep alive his or her 
parental claims or parent-child relationship.319 Certainly such conduct 
can result in very serious harm or detriment to a child if reunification 
efforts are made. Because the details of the abandonment can vary 
greatly, however, the presumption of harm probably depends more on 
the specific circumstances than does the presumption stemming from 
torture, sexual abuse, or chronic abuse. Nevertheless, reunification ef-
forts with a parent who has abandoned a child can suggest a likelihood 
that the child might be very seriously and irreparably harmed, either 
directly by the parent if returned prematurely, or by a lengthy stay in 
foster care if made to await the parent’s remediation. 
5. Chronic Neglect 
 In addition to considering the examples listed, it is worth noting 
that Congress did not include chronic neglect.320 Its absence highlights 
the intentional and affirmative nature of the examples provided.321 
Nevertheless, while most specific references are to affirmative acts, there 
are scattered references to neglect, and child advocates who appeared in 
Congressional hearings have also referred to circumstances that could 
                                                                                                                      
319 As mentioned, ASFA requires that a termination of parental rights petition be filed 
when the abandoned child is an “abandoned infant.” ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 
§ 103(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006)). Aban-
doned infants are often sorted out for individual treatment in state abuse and neglect stat-
utes. Arkansas defines “abandoned infant” and “abandonment” as follows: 
(1) “Abandoned infant” means a juvenile less than nine (9) months of age 
whose parent, guardian, or custodian left the child alone or in the possession 
of another person without identifying information or with an expression of 
intent by words, actions, or omissions not to return for the infant; 
(2) “Abandonment” means the failure of the parent to provide reasonable 
support and to maintain regular contact with the juvenile through statement 
or contact when the failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the 
parent to permit the condition to continue for an indefinite period in the fu-
ture and failure to support or maintain regular contact with the juvenile 
without just cause or an articulated intent to forego parental responsibility. 
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(1), (2) (West 2008). In addition, many states have “safe haven” 
laws that apply to the abandonment of infants under appropriate conditions. See, e.g., 
Mont. Code Ann. § 40-6-417 (2007). 
320 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
321 See id. 
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constitute neglect and chronic neglect.322 Especially emphasized were 
substance addictions; for example, Michigan’s Lieutenant Governor 
Connie Binsfeld argued that no reasonable efforts should be required 
in chronic circumstances—when “multiple attempts have been made to 
rehabilitate the family or when substance abuse has been ongoing and 
has resulted in previous harm to the children and the addiction has 
proved to be intractable even with appropriate treatment.”323 Similar 
views were expressed by child advocates Peter Digre and Albert J. Sol-
nit.324 Digre argued that reasonable efforts should not be made for 
“parents with long-term and chronic addictions.”325 Solnit noted it was 
“too late for family preservation” when “the child has already been . . . 
severely neglected to the degree that it is life-threatening or leads to se-
rious physical impairment.”326
 In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was quick to rec-
ognize neglect and nonaffirmative conduct as a basis for bypassing rea-
sonable efforts when construing the state’s aggravated circumstances 
exceptions.327 In In re Ashley, the parent argued that Maine’s aggravated 
circumstance exception required affirmative conduct.328 The statutory 
definition provided, in part, that the state was not required to use rea-
sonable efforts when the parent had “‘subjected the child to aggravated 
circumstances including, but not limited to . . . [r]ape, gross sexual mis-
conduct, gross sexual assault, sexual abuse, incest, aggravated assault, 
kidnapping, promotion of prostitution, abandonment, torture, chronic 
                                                                                                                      
322 See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. H2013 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce) 
(commenting that the legislation protects children who “ through no fault of their own are 
unable to return to their natural parents” either because of abuse or neglect). 
323 See Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 33 (statement of Lt. Gov. Bins-
feld). Lt. Gov. Binsfeld maintained that it “would be very helpful to the States if [Congress 
would] define ‘reasonable efforts.’” Id. at 37. Binsfeld, as part of her testimony, shared the 
recommendations made by Michigan’s Special Commission on Adoption to enable a by-
pass of reasonable efforts. Id. at 33. She also discussed the harm to children left in foster 
care while the state provided efforts to rehabilitate parents who had committed egregious 
crimes against the children or their siblings. See id. at 30–34. 
324 See id. at 110 (statement of Digre). Digre was then the Director of the L. A. County 
Department of Children and Family Services. Id. at 110. Solnit was then a Senior Research 
Scientist for the Yale University Child Study Center and Commissioner for the Connecticut 
Department of Mental Health. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 104 Cong. 95 (1997) (statement of Albert J. Solnit, M.D.) [here-
inafter Solnit Hearing]. 
325 See Barriers to Adoption Hearing, supra note 135, at 116 (statement of Digre). 
326 Solnit Hearing, supra note 224, at 97. 
327 See In re Ashley, 762 A.2d 941, 947 (Me. 2000). 
328 See id. 
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abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.’”329 The 
father argued his actions were only those of gross neglect.330 Moreover, 
he asserted that because the statutory examples encompassed only af-
firmative and criminal acts, his actions failed to satisfy the statutory 
phrase the trial court relied on for its findings of aggravated circum-
stances: “treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.”331
 The court disagreed, ruling that both action and inaction qualified 
as aggravating factors under the statute.332 The court emphasized both 
the use of the phrases “subjected to” and “treatment.”333 While ac-
knowledging that “[n]eglect . . . will rarely constitute the heinous or 
abhorrent treatment envisioned by the Legislature,” the court found 
that there was “no question . . . that the severe neglect to which the fa-
ther subjected Ashley and her infant brother” qualified.334 The court 
noted Ashley and her two-month-old brother were “ignored for hours, 
if not for days, in a shockingly unsanitary environment. They sat in 
their own excrement, unattended, unfed, and unwashed. They received 
no human contact for hours on end.”335 The two-month-old had been 
put to bed in his car seat, which was placed in his bassinet.336 From ap-
proximately 11:00 that evening until 1:15 the following afternoon, no 
one tended to the baby’s needs.337 The mother called around 1:15 p.m. 
to report her baby had died in his sleep.338
 State legislative definitions are also largely consistent with the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s holding in In re Ashley. Some states, 
such as Oklahoma and South Dakota, explicitly included chronic ne-
glect as a basis for allowing discretionary bypass of reasonable efforts.339 
                                                                                                                      
 
329 Id. at 946 (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (Supp. 2007)). 
330 Id. at 947. 
331 Id. In effect, the father argued ejusdem generis. See id.; Jellum & Hricik, supra note 
79, at 159 (defining the term ejusdem generis). 
332 See In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947. 
333 See id. 
334 Id. Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals also concluded that aggravated circum-
stances, as defined by its legislature, was not limited to intentional conduct and included 
neglect. See State v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). In Risland, however, the 
court noted that the Oregon legislature had listed two examples of aggravated circum-
stances that could include nonintentional conduct, “‘neglect’ resulting in a child’s death 
or serious physical injury.” Id. 
335 Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947–48. 
336 Id. at 944. 
337 Id. 
338 Id. at 943–44. 
339 Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7003-4.6 (2007) (allowing bypass when “the parent . . . has in-
flicted chronic abuse, chronic neglect or torture on the child, a sibling of the child or an-
other child within the household”); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-8A-21.1(3) (2008) (allowing 
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More often, however, states have qualified their neglect grounds with 
specific “aggravating” factors.340 For example, Indiana requires criminal 
neglect, which can be found when a parent “has been convicted of . . . 
neglect of a dependent,”341 while Alaska dictates that a child must have 
“suffered substantial physical harm” as a result of the neglect.342 In ad-
dition, Kansas requires “life threatening” neglect,343 while Montana re-
quires “chronic, severe” neglect.344 Thus, while including some form of 
neglect as an aggravating circumstance, states have also recognized the 
need to include only those circumstances that reflect very serious 
harms, either because of the very serious and immediate harm that 
may be inflicted or when the chronic nature of the neglect forecasts a 
long term foster stay for the child before the court. 
B. “[S]ubjected the child to aggravated circumstances” 
 When faced with the explicit task of applying the aggravated cir-
cumstances exception, most courts agree that to be “aggravated,” the 
situation must reflect conduct or harm that is more than serious. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals examined the aggravated circumstances 
phrase in 2002 and concluded that it required “circumstances . . . involv-
ing relatively more serious types of harm or detriment to a child.”345 
One year later, New Jersey’s intermediate appellate court similarly exam-
ined, along with other factors,346 the ordinary meaning of the phrase.347 
The court considered “any circumstances that increase the severity of 
                                                                                                                      
bypass when the parent has “subjected the child or another child to torture, sexual abuse, 
abandonment for at least six months, chronic physical, mental or emotional injury, or 
chronic neglect”). 
340 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086 (2008); Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.6 (2007); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 38-2202(c) (Supp. 2007); Mont. Code. Ann. § 41-3-423(2)(a) (2007). 
341 Ind. Code Ann. § 31-34-21-5.6. 
342 Alaska Stat. § 47.10.086. 
343 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2202(c). 
344 Mont. Code. Ann. § 41-3-423(2)(a). 
345 Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. 
346 A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 224–34. The court interpreted New Jersey’s ASFA provisions by 
looking at the language used, the purpose of the legislation, and the statutory context of 
the phrase. See id. 
347 See id. at 227–28. The New Jersey statute at issue excepted aggravated circumstances 
by providing that no reasonable efforts were required when “[t]he parent has subjected 
the child to aggravated circumstances of abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment.” Id. at 
219–20 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4C-11.3 (West 2008)). The court noted that the New 
Jersey legislature “has chosen to use the term ‘aggravated circumstances’ as a modifier of 
‘abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment.’ . . . Stated another way, it appears that the de-
gree, or extent, of the ‘abuse, neglect, cruelty or abandonment’ would seemingly deter-
mine whether ‘aggravating circumstances’ are present.” Id. at 227 (citation omitted). 
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the abuse or neglect, or add to its injurious consequences, [to equate] 
to ‘aggravated circumstances.’”348
 That “aggravated” means something worse than the typical, but 
still serious, abuse or neglect case is fairly apparent.349 The meaning 
and impact of the phrases “subjected the child to,” as well as “circum-
stances,” however, are less apparent.350 These phrases are not used in 
the CAPTA and TPR exceptions.351 Their use thus distinguishes the 
aggravated circumstances exception and consequently their meaning 
and impact are important to consider.352
 With the exception of CAPTA’s felony circumstance,353 both the 
CAPTA and TPR provisions rely upon the validity of the presumption 
that a parent who has caused or allowed “another child” to be harmed 
will also cause harm to the child before the court should reunification 
efforts be made.354 These provisions require no specific evidence con-
cerning the child before the court.355 The presumed risk to the subject-
child is derived solely from a specific, concrete, and very serious harm, 
either a CAPTA act or an involuntary TPR, which the parent inflicted 
upon another child.356 In contrast, the aggravated circumstances ex-
ception relies upon the validity of a presumption that a parent who has 
previously created aggravated circumstances concerning “the child” 
before the court will harm the same child in the future if reunification 
efforts are provided.357 The predicted future harm is thus explicitly de-
rivative only in the sense that a prior circumstance concerning the sub-
ject-child is used to predict a future harm to the same child. 
                                                                                                                      
348 Id. at 233. The court focused on whether the circumstances would create an unac-
ceptably high risk to the health, safety and welfare of the child; if so, they are “aggravated,” 
and thus reasonable efforts may be bypassed. See id. The court concluded that “‘aggravated 
circumstances’ embodies the concept that the nature of the abuse or neglect must have 
been so severe or repetitive that to attempt reunification would jeopardize and compro-
mise the safety of the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable risk 
to be abused.” Id. 
349 See id. 
350 See id. at 220. 
351 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii) (2006)). 
352 See A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 224–34. 
353 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(IV) (when a parent has “committed a 
felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of the par-
ent”). 
354 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
355 See id. 
356 See id. 
357 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
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 On the other hand, the aggravated circumstances exception is 
triggered not only when the child before the court has been directly 
harmed by aggravated circumstances—when the child has been tor-
tured, for example—but also when the child has been “subjected” to 
the aggravated circumstance.358 This language raises the question of 
whether aggravated circumstances can be derived from a situation in-
volving another child of the parent, and if so, how closely linked to the 
subject-child those circumstances must be. 
 The New York Court of Appeals directly faced the first part of this 
question in 2003 in a termination of parental rights case, In re Marino 
S.,359 and affirmed that the aggravated circumstances need not be di-
rectly inflicted upon the subject-child, but can instead be derived from 
circumstances involving another child.360
 The New York Family Court in this case found that Shaina, the eld-
est of the mother’s three children, was raped by the man who had fa-
thered her two younger siblings and who lived with her mother.361 The 
court also found that the mother had “severely abused” Shaina, by 
knowingly allowing her to be raped and by delaying medical treatment, 
which endangered her life.362 When affirming the Family Court’s opin-
ion, the New York Court of Appeals relied upon the severe abuse of 
Shaina to support its finding of aggravated circumstances concerning 
the younger children.363
 New York’s statutory scheme included exceptions to reasonable 
efforts similar to ASFA.364 It included an aggravated circumstances ex-
ception that used ASFA’s language: reasonable efforts could be bypassed 
                                                                                                                      
358 See, e.g., In re Custody & Guardianship of Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 831 (Fam. 
Ct. 1999), aff’d, 741 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (App. Div. 2002), aff’d, 795 N.E.2d 21, 30 (N.Y. 
2003). Domestic violence directed at an adult in the household could also qualify, so long 
as the violence is shown to be an aggravated circumstance to which the child has been 
subjected. See id. 
359 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28. 
360 Id. at 28–29. 
361 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 825. 
362 Id. at 829. 
363 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28. 
364 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009). For example, no reason-
able efforts are required under New York law when the parent of the child before the 
court has murdered another child of the parent. Id. Section 1039b-(b) further provides 
that if any of the exceptions exist, diligent reunification efforts are not required “unless 
the court determines that providing reasonable efforts would be in the best interests of the 
child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would likely result in the re-
unification of the parent and the child in the foreseeable future.” Id.; see also In re Marino, 
693 N.Y.S.2d at 828 (using the language of § 1039-b(b) to support the derivative findings 
of abuse). 
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when the parent had “subjected the child to aggravated circum-
stances.”365 New York defined aggravated circumstances to mean, 
among other things, “severe or repeated abuse.”366
 The parents focused on the severe abuse provisions.367 Two of the 
three definitions of “severe abuse” encompassed the abuse facts in Mar-
ino, and both referred only to circumstances directly involving “the 
child”: 
 (i) the child has been found to be an abused child as a result 
of reckless or intentional acts of the parent committed under 
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, 
which result in serious physical injury to the child . . . ; or 
 (ii) the child has been found to be an abused child as de-
fined [elsewhere] . . . as a result of such parent’s acts; pro-
vided, however, the respondent must have committed or 
knowingly allowed to be committed a felony sex offense as de-
fined [elsewhere].368
The parents argued that the severe abuse, and thus the aggravated cir-
cumstances, covered only Shaina, not her siblings.369 While the third 
definition of severe abuse explicitly recognized derivative abuse, deem-
ing the child before the court to be severely abused if the parent had 
committed murder, manslaughter, assault or aggravated assault of an-
other child of the parent370 it did not apply to the facts in Marino.371
 The Court of Appeals declared: “We refuse to read the absence of 
specific references to siblings in subparagraphs (i) and (ii)” as prevent-
ing derivative findings of abuse.372 “It would be unthinkable to inter-
pret the Social Services Law so that a derivative finding can be made 
when a parent assaults a sibling, but not when the parent rapes a sibling 
or seriously injures her under circumstances evincing a depraved indif-
                                                                                                                      
365 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-b(b)(1). 
366 In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (quoting and construing N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 
§ 1012(j) (McKinney Supp. 2009) (referencing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(8) (McKinney 
Supp. 2009)). 
367 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28–30. 
368 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added). 
369 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28. 
370 N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(8)(a)(iii). 
371 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 29. The court reasoned that “[a]nomalous though it 
may seem, however, this subparagraph was not triggered in the present case because the 
conduct at issue was violent rape causing life-threatening injuries, and not homicide or 
assault.” Id. (construing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b(8)(a)(iii)). 
372 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 29. 
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ference to her life.”373 Thus, while Shaina was the only direct victim of 
severe abuse, the court affirmed that the siblings were severely abused 
and thus subjected to aggravated circumstances.374
 Much of the reasoning in Marino supports the use of derivative 
findings for ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception.375 In Marino, 
one definition of severe abuse explicitly recognized derivative abuse and 
the Court of Appeals relied on this to extend the concept of derivative 
abuse to the remaining definitions.376 In ASFA, both the CAPTA and 
TPR exceptions explicitly encompass derivative abuse, suggesting deriva-
tive abuse should also be recognized for the aggravated circumstances 
exception.377 Additionally, the language of ASFA’s aggravated circum-
stances exception is different than its CAPTA and TPR counterparts in a 
way that is consistent with recognizing derivative abuse or harm.378 The 
aggravated circumstances exception requires that the child before the 
court only be “subjected” to those circumstances.379 Unlike the New 
York statutory provisions, ASFA does not include any specific definitions 
for aggravated circumstances requiring “the child” before the court to 
be a direct victim of the abuse or neglect.380 None of the suggested defi-
nitions for aggravated circumstances— “abandonment, torture, chronic 
abuse, and sexual abuse” —must be directed at the subject-child.381 
ASFA also allows an exception to required reasonable efforts for the 
child before the court if a felony assault resulted in serious bodily injury 
to either the child or another child of the parent.382 Finally, as each of 
the three Marino courts noted—the Family Court, the Appellate Divi-
sion, and the Court of Appeals—ASFA is premised upon and relies 
upon the validity of derivative harms.383
 While the use of derivative harms appears permissible, the phrase 
“subjected the child to” indicates that the circumstances must, in some 
                                                                                                                      
373 Id. 
374 See id. 
375 See id. 
376 See id. 
377 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2006)). Except for the felony circumstance, all of the 
CAPTA and TPR circumstances rely on the direct abuse of one child of the parent to trig-
ger the presumption that the child before the court will also be abused. Id. 
378 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii). 
379 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
380 Id. 
381 Id. 
382 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(IV). 
383 See supra notes 238–245 and accompanying text. 
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way, be related to the child before the court.384 The New York Court of 
Appeals Marino analysis does not address the degree to which the 
phrase “subjected to” requires the state to demonstrate that the aggra-
vated circumstances evince harm, or risk of harm, to the child before 
the court.385 But the court implicitly acknowledges there must be some 
connection.386 The decision notes that “courts have consistently sus-
tained derivative findings where a [parent’s] abuse of [one] child is so 
closely connected with the care of another child as to indicate that the 
second child is equally at risk” and that “children who are not them-
selves the direct targets of abuse may, in accordance with the proof, suffer 
damage from witnessing the severe abuse of their siblings.”387
 Another New York decision, In re William S., suggests that a lack of 
connection would require the state to provide reasonable efforts to the 
child before the court.388 The family court in William S. emphasized 
that New York’s statute allowing aggravated circumstances (or any other 
circumstances) to excuse reasonable efforts is subject to a statutory “un-
less” provision: the court may require reasonable efforts if it “deter-
mines that providing reasonable efforts would be in the best interests of 
the child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would 
likely result in the reunification of the parent and the child in the fore-
seeable future.”389 This provision places the ultimate burden of proof 
on the agency seeking to deny reasonable efforts to show “that reason-
able efforts are not in the child’s best interest.”390 In Marino, noted the 
William S. court, the parents were given “full opportunity” to come for-
ward with evidence to support their contention that reasonable efforts 
should be provided.391 Presumably, if the aggravated circumstances 
                                                                                                                      
384 ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
385 In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28. 
386 See id. at 28–29. 
387 Id. (emphasis added). One of the children found to have been derivatively abused 
was in the same bed when her father raped Shaina. Id. at 29. The Marino trial court simi-
larly noted that children who are not direct targets are likely to be harmed by a parent who 
has already harmed another in his or her care, and that they are also like to suffer from 
seeing their sibling mistreated. In re Marino, 693 N.Y.S.2d at 831. The trial court also ob-
served that derivative findings were “similar to findings of neglect based upon domestic 
violence between adults within the child’s home when no physical injury to the child has 
occurred.” Id. 
388 In re William S., 832 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (Fam. Ct. 2007). 
389 Id. (quoting N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009)). 
390 Id. at 787 (citing In re Sarah B., No. N-10783/98, 2003 WL 1923540, at *6 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. Mar. 31, 2003)). 
391 Id. at 785–86 (citing In re Marino, 795 N.E.2d at 28). 
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were not sufficiently connected to the child before the court, New York 
would require reasonable efforts. 
 The specific language of the CAPTA and TPR exceptions, however, 
does not require any connection or proof of harm to the subject-child, 
nor does the language of the aggravated circumstances exception 
clearly require child-specific harm to the subject-child.392 Language in 
an earlier version of the legislation perhaps came close to a child-
specific harm requirement, that is, allowing states to forego reasonable 
efforts when there are “serious circumstances that endanger a child’s 
health or safety.”393 But otherwise, legislative history yields very few spe-
cifics on this issue. Two state courts, however, in Oregon and New Jer-
sey, have considered the relevance of specific harm to the child before 
the court.394
 The argument before the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Ris-
land was limited to whether the specific effects of the circumstances on 
the child before the court may be considered to establish aggravated 
circumstances.395 The court’s opinion, however, provides a basis for ar-
guing that the effects on the child must be considered if relevant to an 
argument against aggravated circumstances.396
 The Oregon court relied heavily on the legislature’s use of the 
word “circumstances” to conclude that the results on the child, both 
direct and indirect, could be considered when determining if aggra-
vated circumstances existed.397 The court explained additional effects 
                                                                                                                      
 
392 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii) (2006)). One could argue that without proof that the 
child in question would suffer harm, providing reunification efforts would presumably be 
in the best interest of the child and thus consistent with ASFA’s mandate, that “in deter-
mining reasonable efforts to be made . . . the child’s health and safety shall be the para-
mount concern.” See id. § 671(a)(15)(A). Further, New York does require this. See supra 
text accompanying notes 388–391. 
393 143 Cong. Rec. S12,183 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (amendment by Sen. Craig to H.R. 
867, § 101(a), 105th Cong., providing that reasonable efforts shall not be required “if the 
State, through legislation, has specified cases in which the State is not required to make 
reasonable efforts because of serious circumstances that endanger a child’s health or 
safety”). 
394 See A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 234–35; Risland, 51 P.3d at 705–06;. 
395 See Risland, 51 P.3d at 705. 
396 See id. at 705–06. 
397 Id. The Oregon statute considered was different from ASFA in a couple of respects. 
See Or. Rev. Stat. § 419B.340(5), (5)(a)(A) (2007). First, the statute allowed a bypass of 
reasonable efforts when aggravated “circumstances exist.” Id. (emphasis added). While “sub-
jected to” is included in some of the listed examples of aggravated circumstances—for exam-
ple, “the parent has subjected any child to intentional starvation or torture” —it is not spe-
cifically used with the broader term “aggravated circumstances.” § 419B.340(5)(a)(E). 
Further, the Oregon court explicitly noted the legislature’s use of “any” child in some of the 
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must be considered when evaluating whether to terminate reunifica-
tion efforts, as they may establish the lack of aggravated circumstances: 
We caution that, in concluding that the circumstances here are 
“aggravated” . . . , we do not rely solely on the parents’ actions 
and conditions. As [the] father observes, the nature and scope 
of the parents’ problems are not unlike many examples of pa-
rental circumstances that would support the court’s depend-
ency jurisdiction yet still require [the child protection agency] 
to make further reasonable efforts to reunify the family.398
Ultimately, the court ruled that the aggravated circumstances exception 
applied and specifically found relevant the harm suffered by the child 
before the court and the failure of extensive remediation efforts di-
rected at the parents.399
 The more specific issue of whether a court must consider the ef-
fects on the subject-child when the state seeks to excuse reasonable ef-
forts based on aggravated circumstances was raised by a dissenting 
opinion in a New Jersey Appellate Division case, New Jersey Division of 
Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G..400 A.R.G. involved three children who 
were the subject of abuse and neglect complaints filed against their fa-
ther.401 The trial court had excused the child protection agency from 
reasonable efforts for all of the children, holding that the middle child 
had been severely abused and that, given the severity of abuse, the 
other two children were at risk for abuse.402 The New Jersey Appellate 
Division, in a split decision, affirmed.403 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court affirmed in part, but only after “elucidating” the Appellate Divi-
sion’s standard.404
                                                                                                                      
enumerated aggravated circumstances exceptions as contributing to its understanding of 
“circumstances,” § 419B.340(5)(a)(A); Risland, 51 P.3d at 705 (including, for example, “[t]he 
parent by abuse or neglect has caused the death of any child”). The Risland court relied on 
this to include within aggravated circumstances other, non-enumerated circumstances with 
“‘any’ child, not merely the child who is the subject of the dependency petition.” Risland, 51 
P.3d at 705. Consistent with this, the court included in its “circumstances” that the subject-
child’s sibling had “suffered severe mental injury as a result of his exposure to significant 
domestic violence, the parents’ drug use, and a highly unstable home life.” Id. 
398 Risland, 51 P.3d at 706. 
399 Id. at 705–06. 
400 See A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 239–40 (Eichen, J., dissenting). 
401 Id. at 216, 221. 
402 Id. at 221, 223. 
403 Id. at 236. 
404 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 845 A.2d 106, 119–20 (N.J. 2004). 
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 The discussions in the Appellate Division’s majority and dissenting 
opinions, as well as the subsequent New Jersey Supreme Court opinion, 
are instructive.405 Because New Jersey had not provided a legislative 
definition of aggravated circumstances,406 Judge Fall’s majority opinion 
focused on ASFA, its purpose, and its language to determine the mean-
ing of the phrase.407 Judge Fall’s opinion concluded that ASFA’s aggra-
vated circumstances exception “embodies the concept that the nature 
of the abuse or neglect must have been so severe or repetitive that to 
attempt reunification would jeopardize and compromise the safety of 
the child, and would place the child in a position of an unreasonable 
risk to be reabused.”408 Like the Oregon court in Risland, the opinion 
also read ASFA’s provision to allow circumstances beyond parental 
conduct to be considered when assessing the situation for aggravated 
circumstances, for example, “whether the offer or receipt of services 
would correct the conditions that led to the abuse or neglect within a 
reasonable time.”409 The opinion noted that two of the three children 
in the case before the court had had been beaten by the father, the 
middle child “repeatedly” and once “savage[ly].”410 In addition, all 
three children had witnessed the father’s abuse of their mother.411 The 
majority determined that the “totality of the evidence paints a vivid pic-
ture of the children and others in [the father’s] household being sub-
                                                                                                                      
405 See id.; A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 221–23; A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 239–40 (Eichen, J., dissent-
ing). 
406 A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 226–27. 
407 Id. at 224–34. In the opinion, Judge Fall provided an extensive review of how other 
states dealt with ASFA’s aggravate circumstance exception. Id. at 227–32. The review 
showed a focus on past or present circumstances or harm: for example, Maine’s definition 
includes “[r]ape, gross sexual misconduct, gross sexual assault, sexual abuse, incest, aggra-
vated assault, kidnapping, promotion of prostitution, abandonment, torture, chronic 
abuse or any other treatment that is heinous or abhorrent to society.” Id. at 230–31 (quot-
ing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (2003) (current version at tit. 22, 
§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (Supp. 2007)) (alteration in original; other alterations and emphasis 
omitted). Missouri’s definition states: “The parent has subjected the child to a severe act or 
recurrent acts of physical, emotional or sexual abuse toward the child, including an act of 
incest” A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 231 (quoting Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.183(7)(1) (2003) (current 
version at § 211.183(7)(1)(2004)) (brackets in original; other alterations and emphasis 
omitted)). 
408 A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 233. 
409 Id. at 234; Risland, 51 P.3d at 706. The opinion can also be interpreted such that 
conduct alone may constitute “aggravated circumstances,” if the conduct is “particularly 
heinous or abhorrent to society.” A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 234. 
410 A.R.G. 824 A.2d at 234. The court acknowledged that even the middle child had 
“suffered no broken bones or prolonged medical treatment.” Id. at 234–35. 
411 Id. 
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jected to a violent and intimidating atmosphere,”412 and held it was ap-
propriate to refuse reasonable efforts to reunite the children with their 
father based on aggravated circumstances.413
 Judge Eichen explicitly raised in her dissent the issue of “whether 
conduct alone is sufficient to establish a case . . . or whether the effect 
of that conduct must be factored into the equation.”414 She argued that 
other mitigating factors should have been considered in A.R.G., noting 
that the family “had no prior history of intervention” by the state’s 
child protection system and that there had been no psychological 
evaluation of the father to determine if services might remediate the 
problems that led to the abuse.415 One of her “serious reservations” was 
“if the evidence underpinning the trial court’s decision in this case can 
be viewed as supporting a conclusion of ‘aggravated circumstances of 
abuse,’ consider how many other cases alleging child abuse . . . could 
arguably fit within the [same] definition.”416
 The case was reviewed on appeal by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.417 In response, the court created two categories of aggravated 
circumstances—one where it is permissible to consider parental con-
duct alone and one where further inquiry is required.418 The proper 
inquiry should be whether the “abuse was of such a nature that stand-
ing alone, it compels the conclusion that reunification should not be 
required,” for example, “‘where the parental conduct is particularly 
heinous or abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive 
beatings, torture, or sexual abuse.’”419 If so, the court’s language sug-
gests a strict liability of sorts: “[T]he acts complained of, by their very 
nature are, so unnatural or depraved that the fundamental bond that is 
                                                                                                                      
412 Id. at 235. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. at 240 (Eichen, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Eichen’s dissent first 
criticized the trial court’s actions and the majority’s affirmance on due process grounds. 
Id. at 237. She also questioned the sufficiency of the evidence used to excuse reasonable 
reunification efforts: “[T]here was no medical testimony concerning the full extent and 
nature of the injury to R.L.G. from A.R.G.’s physical abuse. . . . Nor was there a psycho-
logical evaluation of R.L.G., or the other children, which might have afforded some insight 
into the emotional effects of the abuse on the children.” Id. at 239. 
415 A.R.G. at 240 (Eichen, J., dissenting). 
416 Id. at 239–40. The majority’s response to Judge Eichen’s dissent was that the father 
offered no “proofs or evidence” challenging the claim of aggravated circumstances and 
that “everything that could have been submitted was fully before the court.” Id. at 236. 
417A.R.G. 845 A.2d at 110. 
418 Id. at 119. Both categories first require, however, that the conduct be “severe or re-
petitive.” Id. at 118. If not, aggravated circumstances cannot exist and reunification efforts 
are required. Id. at 118–19. 
419 Id. at 118–19 (quoting A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 213). 
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the basis of the reunification notion is deemed to be irremediably un-
dermined.”420 If these circumstances exist, “the conduct may . . . be said 
to constitute ‘aggravated circumstances,’”421 and “the abusive parent’s 
future remedial efforts would be of no consequence.”422
 This first category of aggravated circumstances seems to reflect 
those in the CAPTA criminal acts exception: where a parent has in-
flicted a very serious harm; where the infliction was somewhat immedi-
ate; where the state would have little or no warning before a similar 
harm was inflicted if the subject-child were reunited with the parent; 
and where the state will likely remain unsure of change by the parent, 
even with the parent’s compliance.423
 For the court’s second category, circumstances aside from parental 
conduct must be considered, specifically the effect on the child and 
whether reunification efforts can sufficiently address the problem 
within a reasonable time.424 Examples that usually belong in this cate-
gory are “abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in 
permanent injury, [and] serious neglect and mental abuse.”425 These 
cases “[require] inquiry beyond the mere conduct of the parent,” to 
determine if the circumstances have “irremediably undermined the 
parent-child relationship” and thus “support the conclusion that reunit-
ing the family will place the child at risk.”426 Thus a court “may con-
sider whether to admit expert testimony about the conduct and its rela-
tionship to the parent-child bond,” and “whether the parents’ remedial 
efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse.”427 
“It is the result of all of [these] inquiries that will determine whether 
reunification efforts are required.”428
                                                                                                                      
 
420 Id. at 119. A student author refers to this, as used in New York cases, as the “funda-
mental defect” theory. See May, supra note 244, at 614. One New York court described the 
situation as reflecting “such an impaired level of parental judgment as to create a substan-
tial risk of harm for any child in [the parents’] care.” Id. (quoting In re Dutchess Co. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 661 N.Y.S.2d 670, 671 (App. Div. 1997)). 
421 A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 118 (quoting A.R.G., 824 A.2d at 234). 
422 Id. at 119. 
423 See id. 
424 Id. 
425 Id. 
426 A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 119. 
427 Id. 
428 Id. The court first discusses this additional evidence in terms of requirements, that 
is, that there is “another class of cases . . . that requires inquiry beyond the mere conduct of 
the parent.” See id. (emphasis added). Later the court discusses this evidence as something 
the court “may” consider, that is, “[i]n [these] cases, the court may consider whether to 
admit expert testimony about the conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond 
along with an assessment of whether the parents’ remedial efforts are sufficient to elimi-
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 For New Jersey’s child welfare agency to validly deny reasonable 
reunification efforts in this second class of cases, a court must have evi-
dence that specifically connects the parent’s conduct or circumstances 
to a harm or risk of harm to the child before the court.429 In effect, the 
court requires a focus on the subject-child’s future health and safety 
should reasonable efforts be required.430 While the court does not oth-
erwise specify the level of harm or the probability of the risk required, 
presumably each must be that which is evident from the conduct re-
quired in the first class of cases.431 Thus the harm must be serious 
enough to approximate a break of the “fundamental bond that is the 
basis of the reunification notion,” and it must also establish that reuni-
fication efforts will create an unacceptable and very serious risk to the 
child.432
 The New Jersey Supreme Court’s treatment of its second category 
of cases is generally consistent with ASFA’s requirement at the outset of 
its clarification of reasonable efforts—that “in determining reasonable 
efforts to be made . . . , the child’s health and safety shall be the para-
mount concern.”433 In the first category, the exception applies without 
regard to any child-specific circumstances or harm concerning the child 
before the court.434 Because the New Jersey Supreme Court speaks of 
whether the exception applies, however, a court could still exercise the 
discretion, in either category, to provide reunification efforts if any evi-
dence is introduced to suggest the presumption stemming from the ag-
gravated circumstances is not valid.435 Indeed, ASFA’s mandate that the 
child’s health and safety is paramount, and its explicit directive that the 
child’s health and safety must be paramount when decisions about rea-
sonable efforts are made, requires that the court consider not only cir-
                                                                                                                      
nate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse.” See id. (emphasis added). It is not fully clear, but 
one could read the court’s full discussion to suggest that “requires” is what the court in-
tended. See id. 
429 See id. 
430 See id. 
431 See A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 119. 
432 See id. at 118–19. Once the inquiry goes beyond the parental conduct and looks at 
other factors, the inquiry becomes whether reasonable efforts should be denied, in addi-
tion to whether reasonable efforts may be denied. See id. 
433 ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2006)). 
434 See A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 118–19. 
435 See id. at 119. 
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cumstances that make the case for an exception, but also circumstances 
that make a case against a denial of reunification efforts.436
IV. Recommendations 
 As stated at the outset, I have no tidy solution for the individuals 
who must ultimately make such difficult decisions about the lives of 
children. I do, however, offer an analytical approach for determining 
whether to deny reunification efforts. To approve a denial of reason-
able efforts, a court (or other decision-maker) must not only require 
that the circumstances qualify under one of the ASFA exceptions,437 
but also be satisfied that if reunification efforts are attempted, the child 
is likely to be very seriously harmed. To reach this point, the court must 
first find that a very serious harm has been created or caused by the 
parent of the child before the court. When determining the seriousness 
of this harm, any relevant factors should be considered, including de-
rivative circumstances. There must, however, be a nexus between the 
harm the parent has already created and the harm predicted to the 
subject-child should reunification efforts be attempted. Finally, the 
predicted harm must be of sufficient magnitude to justify denying rea-
sonable efforts. 
A. Require a Very Serious Harm at the Outset 
 Both the CAPTA and the TPR exceptions apply to parents who 
have attempted to inflict, have inflicted, or have allowed to be inflicted 
very serious or severe harms upon their children.438 A court should be 
required to find a similar harm for the aggravated circumstances ex-
ception to apply. 
 The CAPTA and prior involuntary TPR exceptions have an advan-
tage of encompassing only distinct and concrete situations or harms.439 
The aggravated circumstances exception, however, must function as the 
catch-all, as the safety net for children affected by circumstances that 
make reunification efforts dangerous to their health and safety.440 An 
attempt to list the many aggravated circumstances that could justify the 
                                                                                                                      
436 Cf. In re William S., 832 N.Y.S.2d at 786 (noting a child’s health and safety shall be 
the paramount concern when considering a request to deny reasonable efforts). 
437 Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 
Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii) (2006)). 
438 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
439 See id. 
440 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
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denial of reunification efforts has the advantage of definitiveness, but it 
risks leaving out unanticipated circumstances or circumstances that are 
difficult to describe with sufficient specificity. 
 Even Congress, while providing its examples of aggravated circum-
stances (abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse), cau-
tioned that the exception was not to be limited to these situations.441 
Further, as the case law has made apparent, circumstances that might 
not qualify as “aggravated” in some situations—new parents who are 
overwhelmed, for example—should perhaps qualify in other situa-
tions.442 Thus instead of defining aggravated circumstances with an ex-
haustive list, a better approach is to define it by focusing on the level of 
harm required for circumstances to be aggravated. 
 The courts have provided some good guidance here, having 
agreed that something more than serious is required.443 While adjec-
tives in abuse and neglect law must be read as relative, definitions al-
ways help. “Serious” encompasses “[g]rave,” “[n]ot trifling,” “[b]eing of 
such import as to cause anxiety.”444 Severe [abuse] is generally consid-
ered beyond serious [abuse], and includes “[u]nsparing or harsh” 
[language], “causing sharp discomfort or distress; extremely violent or 
intense.”445 Requiring a severe harm would limit the applicability of the 
exception and thus provide some relative clarity. But such a high 
threshold would fail to capture what the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.R.G. identified as “an-
other class of cases” where the health and safety of a child may require 
that reasonable efforts be denied.446 These situations, “which may or 
may not have irremediably undermined the parent-child relationship 
and may or may not support the conclusion that reuniting the family 
will place the child at risk,” require a court to probe further to deter-
mine if the child will be at undue risk with reunification efforts.447
                                                                                                                      
 
441 See id. This wisdom was seemingly borne out by the severe circumstances of neglect 
in Maine’s In re Ashley case, where the two-month old infant died after being untended for 
“hours on end.” In re Ashley, 762 A.2d 941, 943–944, 948 (Me. 2000). 
442 Id. at 948. 
443 N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 845 A.2d 106, 118 (N.J. 2004). 
444 American Heritage College Dictionary, supra note 292, at 1245. 
445 Id. at 1248. 
446 A.R.G., 845 A.2d at 119. 
447 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s language in A.R.G. recognizes that there may 
be two levels of aggravated circumstances, although the qualitative harm or detriment in 
its second level is not clear. See id. Still, the court recognizes that the “aggravated” charac-
teristic of some circumstances will be apparent, but for others further inquiry will be 
needed to determine if they meet the level of “aggravated.” Id. The first level, the court 
concludes, is “[where] the acts complained of, by their very nature are, so unnatural or 
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 Ultimately, while the harmful circumstances for aggravated cir-
cumstances should be significant and therefore exceed serious, they 
should not be limited to the severe and “heinous” circumstances identi-
fied by A.R.G.448 Circumstances less dire, but still very serious, are a bet-
ter compromise for a threshold harm that can preserve the reasonable 
efforts requirement, but also provide states with sufficient power to 
protect the health and safety of their children. 
B. Consider all Relevant Circumstances 
 Congress intended for child protection agencies and courts to 
consider all relevant circumstances when determining if situations fit 
the aggravated circumstances exception. This intent is apparent from 
the language of the exception—aggravated circumstances.449 This read-
ing is also consistent with ASFA’s central policy aim, protecting the 
health and safety of the child.450 As courts have noted, “circumstances” 
should include the effect on the child, any neglect circumstances, and 
any derivative circumstances.451
 If the effect on the child, as opposed to the conduct of the parent, 
is what qualifies a circumstance as aggravated, the court ought to be 
able to consider the effect circumstances. As the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals in Risland emphasized, “circumstances” includes “the total com-
plex of essential attributes and attendant adjuncts,” and not only the 
“aggravated actions and conditions of a parent.”452 The same is true of 
ASFA’s exception. 
 In addition, the circumstances need not involve an affirmative act. 
The severe neglect circumstances in In re Ashley, the case in which the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a finding of aggravated cir-
                                                                                                                      
depraved that the fundamental bond that is the basis of the reunification notion is 
deemed to be irremediably undermined.” This includes “where the conduct is particularly 
heinous or abhorrent to society, involving savage, brutal, or repetitive beatings, torture, or 
sexual abuse . . . .” Id. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.R.G., 824 A.2d 213, 
234 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)). For the second level, the court includes the exam-
ples of abandonment, corporal punishment that does not result in permanent injury, 
[and] serious neglect and mental abuse,” but notes that additional evidence “about the 
conduct and its relationship to the parent-child bond, along with an assessment of whether 
the parents remedial efforts are sufficient to eliminate an unreasonable risk of re-abuse.” 
Id. 
448 Id. 
449 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (2006)). 
450 See supra Part II(A). 
451 See supra Part I(B). 
452 State v. Risland, 51 P.3d 697, 705 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
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cumstances, demonstrate that non-affirmative conduct can cause very 
serious harms.453
 Finally, the court should also consider derivative circumstances 
when determining if aggravated circumstances exist. It is fair to read 
the plain language of the exception— “subjected the child to aggra-
vated circumstances” —as encompassing derivative harms.454 In addi-
tion, the premise of the CAPTA and TPR exceptions in ASFA is deriva-
tive harms.455 Conventional abuse and neglect cases have also long 
relied on derivative harms.456 Recognizing derivative harms is consis-
tent with protecting the health and safety of children. The court should 
certainly consider the very serious abuse of another child of the parent 
as possible aggravated circumstances. 
 Allowing courts to consider any circumstances that contribute to 
the showing of the harm required for aggravated circumstances, along 
with setting the threshold of harm at “very serious,” may appear to 
qualify too many situations as aggravated. But these qualifications only 
constitute the aggravated circumstances. They do not by themselves, 
nor should they, justify the denial of reunification efforts. To deny rea-
sonable efforts, the decision-maker must also be satisfied that the harm 
triggering the exception—the aggravated circumstance—is connected 
to the harm forecast to the subject-child and that the forecast harm is 
sufficient to justify the denial. Further, these requirements should apply 
to all reasonable efforts exceptions, not just aggravated circumstances. 
C. Identify the Nexus Between the Triggering Circumstances and the Anticipated 
Harm to the Child Before the Court 
 For reasonable efforts to be denied, the decision-maker should be 
required to articulate with some specificity the link between the trigger-
ing circumstances (whether CAPTA, TPR, or aggravated) and the threat 
to the future health and safety of the child before the court should re-
unification efforts be attempted. 
 While a threshold showing of a “very serious” harm will allow 
broad latitude for protecting the health and safety of children from 
harmful reasonable efforts, the threshold has two related weaknesses. 
First, while the phrase “very serious” is a bit more concrete than “aggra-
vated circumstances,” a common and firm understanding of what it 
                                                                                                                      
453 In re Ashley, 762 A.2d at 947–48; see supra Part III(A)(5). 
454 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i). 
455 See id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii). 
456 See, e.g., In re Parental Rights of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 1007–08 (Wyo. 1984). 
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constitutes will be difficult to attain. Second, even apart from its vague-
ness, the broad applicability of the phrase risks inviting abuse if not re-
strained. In other words, once the exception is triggered, its applicabil-
ity is restrained only by discretion. The language of the exception offers 
no additional guidance on when a state should exercise this discretion 
to deny reunification efforts. 
 State courts have consistently recognized the difference between 
the applicability of ASFA’s exceptions and the subsequent exercise of 
the discretion to deny efforts.457 Along these same lines, Iowa legisla-
tively restricts the applicability of its aggravated circumstances excep-
tion by requiring evidence that the abuse or neglect “posed a signifi-
cant risk to the life of the child or constituted imminent danger to the 
child.”458 Each of the ASFA exceptions, however, not just the aggravated 
circumstances exception, should be subjected to explicit restrictions 
concerning the denial of reunification efforts to parents. Without some 
restriction, these life-altering decisions will be too susceptible to incon-
sistencies or worse. 
 Accordingly, the decision-maker must first be satisfied that the 
triggering circumstances for any exception are connected to the child 
and the decision before the court; the circumstances should thus fore-
cast a threat to the future health and safety of the child should reunifi-
cation efforts be attempted. 
 When the circumstances are directed at the child before the court, 
this connection is usually self-evident. Derivative circumstances differ, 
however, and must be connected explicitly. Some Florida courts have 
referred to this when discussing termination of parental rights based 
on the abuse of a sibling as finding a “nexus between the abuse and the 
prospective abuse.”459 In typical derivative “risk of abuse or neglect” 
cases, two significant factors help establish or refute this nexus. The 
first of these is a given—the control and physical proximity that comes 
                                                                                                                      
457 E.g., State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 849 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2002); see also supra notes 205–209 and accompanying text. 
458 Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i) (incorporated by reference in Iowa Code § 232.57(2)(b) 
(Supp. 2008)). 
459 In re G.D., 870 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). Similarly, in a District of 
Columbia removal case, the court ruled there can be “no per se rule allowing a child to be 
adjudicated neglected (and thus to be removed from a home) simply because a different 
child within that home has been abused.” In re Kya. B., 857 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C. 2004). 
Instead, the court ruled, there must be “an individualized finding” for each child, justify-
ing that child’s removal from the home. Id. at 473; see also In re Arthur H., 819 N.E.2d 734, 
753 (Ill. 2004) (noting “there here is no per se rule that the neglect of one child conclu-
sively establishes the neglect of another child in the same household”). 
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from the parent-child relationship. The second significant factor is 
proximity in time, that is, how recent the circumstance was that trig-
gered the exception. A third important factor will also be relevant to 
nexus and that is any parental change or failure to change since the 
triggering event. 
 Some Florida case law recognizes nexus is usually established “when 
the parent has a mental or emotional condition that will continue, such 
as mental illness, drug addiction, or pedophilia, and which will make it 
highly probable that in the future the parent will abuse or neglect an-
other child.”460 A number of other factors can be relevant also, includ-
ing the nature of the harm; the conduct or circumstances that resulted 
in the harm; the age, sex, health, abilities, and disabilities of the chil-
dren; and the health, abilities, and disabilities of the parents.461
 In addition, the essentials of the CAPTA criminal acts circum-
stances will usually satisfy a nexus requirement.462 Most of the time, a 
parent who has murdered, committed voluntary manslaughter, or 
committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to one of 
his or her own children, has demonstrated he or she is a parent with 
dangerous propensities who presents an undue risk to his or her other 
children.463 The nexus of control and physical proximity of the parent 
to the child is inherent in the anticipated reunion of parent and child if 
reunification efforts are attempted. Proximity of time, often relevant, is 
usually not a factor in these cases. A parent guilty of the murder of one 
of his or her children, for example, suggests a parent whose “judgment 
and impulse control are so defective” that passage of time is unlikely to 
ease the state’s legitimate concern that the parent will harm other chil-
dren in his or her care.464 Even in some CAPTA-like circumstances, 
though, there can be exceptions. If the murder was a shaken baby case 
that occurred twenty years ago, for example, and the child before the 
court is twelve years old and the current removal was for educational 
neglect, the nexus is not apparent.465 In these circumstances, the 
health and safety needs of the twelve-year-old might require reasonable 
efforts. 
                                                                                                                      
460 In re C.M., 844 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
461 See generally In re C.R., 937 So. 2d 1257, 1262–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); D.P. v. 
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 930 So. 2d 798, 801–02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
462 See ASFA of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii) (2006)). 
463 See id. 
464 See In re Marino S., 795 N.E.2d 21, 28 (N.Y. 2003). 
465 See In re B.B., 440 N.W.2d 594, 594 (Iowa 1989) (child adjudicated neglected be-
cause parents failed to send him to school). 
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 For a prior TPR exception, the nexus between the prior termina-
tion and the anticipated harm to the subject-child requires more than 
the fact of the prior termination of parental rights and the parent’s 
control of or physical access to the child.466 In a termination of paren-
tal rights case, the Florida Supreme Court identified various factors that 
might be relevant: whether the conduct that led to the TPR involved 
“egregious abuse or neglect”; “[t]he amount of time that has passed 
since the prior involuntary termination”; and “evidence of any change 
in circumstances since the prior involuntary termination.”467 The court 
noted a “very recent involuntary termination will tend to indicate a 
greater current risk,” and that “positive life changes can overcome a 
negative history.”468 Certainly circumstances of the prior TPR, of the 
child before the court, and of the parent then and now are likely to be 
relevant when assessing whether the TPR sufficiently predicts harm to 
the child before the court if reunification efforts are ordered. 
 Connecting the triggering harm with the predicted harm to the 
child before the court is one step. The predicted harm must also be 
sufficiently detrimental to the child before a denial of reasonable ef-
forts is justified. 
D. Articulate Anticipated Harm to the Child 
 To justify the denial of reunification efforts, the state should also be 
required to establish a probable and substantial likelihood that the child 
will suffer one of the major harms ASFA sought to prevent—either a 
return to a dangerous home or a stay in foster care that is too long for 
the health and safety of the child.469 These requirements will force states 
to consider whether the parents are able and likely to remediate the 
concerns within a reasonable time.470 If the parents are likely to fix the 
problem, the child is unlikely to suffer the anticipated harm. 
                                                                                                                      
 
466 See ASFA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). 
467 Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So. 2d 602, 610 (Fla. 2004). 
468 Id.; see also In re Div. of Family Servs. v. Smith, 896 A.2d 179, 190 (Del. Fam. Ct. 
2005) (noting mother had not made any significant changes in her parenting skills since 
her prior terminations of parental rights); Kathleen Haggard, Note, Treating Prior Termina-
tions of Parental Rights as Grounds for Present Terminations, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 1051, 1051 
(1998) (arguing that a prior termination of parental rights should provide grounds for 
terminating the parent’s rights to the child before the court “if the State finds the parent’s 
continuing behavior puts the child at risk for abuse or neglect”). 
469 See supra Part II(A). 
470 This requirement is in line with ASFA’s provisions concerning mandatory termination 
of parental rights petitions. As noted, ASFA requires mandatory petitions in several circum-
stances, for example, when one of the CAPTA criminal acts exceptions exists or when a child 
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 If the identified threat to the child’s health or safety is a CAPTA-
like harm, that is, an instantaneous infliction of a very serious harm, 
reunification efforts are less likely to be successful, in large part because 
the risk that something very serious and irreparable might happen is 
just too great. Circumstances may matter, however, including the pas-
sage of time since the triggering event. If the parent appears ready to 
comply with a reunification plan, the court must still consider whether 
the current concern about the parent will linger, despite compliance 
with the plan. Further, the court also must consider whether the parent 
can complete the reunification plan within a reasonable time. Thus the 
court must be cognizant of not only the harm that may result if the 
child is returned to the home before it is safe, but also the harm that 
will accrue from an extended stay in foster care. Either can cause a very 
serious and irreparable harm to the child and either should suffice for 
a denial of reunification efforts. Allowing reunification efforts in 
CAPTA-like circumstances will often, and probably most often, create a 
substantial likelihood of one or the other of these two harms. 
 If the identified threat is one that results from ongoing circum-
stances or actions such as chronic abuse or neglect, the success of re-
unification efforts may be more plausible and the risk to the child, if he 
or she is returned to the home, not as stark and irreparable. If the par-
ents relapse, the child can often be removed again before a significant 
and irreparable harm occurs. (This observation is not meant to dismiss 
the harm that comes from removing the child again. It simply recog-
nizes the importance of preserving the parent-child relationship for the 
child’s long-term health and safety.) That the problem is chronic and 
that the parents may lapse is not sufficient for predicting a substantial 
likelihood of one of the two harms ASFA was meant to address. How-
ever, if there is a substantial likelihood that the chronic nature of the 
parents’ problems will ultimately prevail, or a substantial likelihood that 
the parents will not recover within a reasonable time, this predicts a 
                                                                                                                      
has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. ASFA § 103(a), 42 
U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). One exception to this requirement, however, is when an agency has 
“documented in the case plan . . . a compelling reason for determining that filing such a 
petition would not be in the best interests of the child.” Id. § 675(5)(E)(ii). New York has a 
similar provision affecting the aggravated circumstances exception. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1039-
b(b) (McKinney Supp. 2009) When there are aggravated circumstances, reasonable efforts 
are not required “unless the court determines that providing reasonable efforts would be in 
the best interests of the child, not contrary to the health and safety of the child, and would 
likely result in the reunification of the parent and the child in the foreseeable future. The 
court shall state such findings in its order.” Id. Both ultimately look to the future of the child 
and the child’s health and safety. See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. §§  675(5)(E)(ii), 1039-b(b). 
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long and uncertain stay in foster care. The court does not need to de-
termine that the situation is so bad that the family can never be fixed. 
The court does need to find, however, that it is substantially unlikely 
that the problem can be fixed within a reasonable time. If so, reunifica-
tion efforts should not be provided. 
 The key to both of these situations is “reasonable time.” ASFA has 
established a maximum default “reasonable time” framework by requir-
ing a permanency plan within twelve months after the child enters fos-
ter care and requiring a mandatory termination of parental rights peti-
tion if the child has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent 
twenty-two months.471 The circumstances of individual cases may, how-
ever, require longer or shorter times. States may also wish to establish 
specific or presumptive reasonable times based on the child’s age, simi-
lar to what some states have done when defining the duty to provide 
reasonable reunification efforts.472 If the court finds it substantially 
likely that the concerns will not be successfully remediated within the 
reasonable time and that the concerns present a very serious health or 
safety threat to the subject-child, however, denying reasonable efforts is 
appropriate. 
 A final caution is important. Courts often assess the likelihood of 
parents’ successfully remediating a future threat to the subject-child’s 
health and safety by relying, in whole or part, on the failure of the par-
ents’ prior efforts to remediate their problems. While these are circum-
stances appropriate to consider, the court must also consider if the state 
provided the parents with reasonable reunification efforts. To use the 
parent’s failure to respond to prior efforts as a basis for concluding that 
successful remediation is unlikely in the future requires that the state 
demonstrate the reasonableness of the state’s prior assistance.473
Conclusion 
 The purpose of ASFA’s aggravated circumstances exception is to 
protect children from the harms of a lengthy, uncertain status in the 
dependency system. It is also intended to safeguard these children from 
being returned to unsafe homes. The vague statutory language of the 
aggravated circumstances exception necessitates a thorough method of 
                                                                                                                      
471 See ASFA § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), (E). 
472 For example, California provides that reunification efforts for a child age three or 
older “shall not exceed a period of 12 months from the date the child entered foster care.” 
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(a)(1) (2008). For a child under three, services “shall not 
exceed a period of six months from the date the child entered foster care.” Id. § 361.5(a)(2). 
473 For a discussion supporting this concern, see Bean, supra note 31, at 342–67. 
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analysis for courts to apply in determining whether to deny reasonable 
efforts to reunite abused or neglected children with their parents. The 
analysis delineated in this Article presents an approach that will en-
courage consistency within the judicial process in accordance with the 
purpose of the exception. 
